Summary
Economic growth in Slovenia exceeded expectations in the second quarter despite heightened geopolitical tensions globally. The limited set of available data and estimates also point to continued growth in the third quarter. Inflation remains elevated.
Euro area economic growth of 0.4% in the second quarter exceeded expectations, pointing to the resilience of the economy despite heightened geopolitical tensions and high energy prices. Survey indicators for July and August suggest that growth continued, particularly amid a strengthening of activity in manufacturing. Risks to further growth nevertheless remain elevated owing to persistent geopolitical uncertainty, as reflected in relatively weak business confidence. Following the renewed escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, headline inflation rose to 2.9% in July. In addition to energy prices, the increase reflected higher core inflation, at 2.5%, although the latest data do not yet point to more pronounced indirect effects.
At its June meeting, amid heightened inflationary pressures, the ECB Governing Council raised all three key ECB interest rates by 0.25 percentage points. At its July meeting, it left them unchanged. The Governing Council justified its July decision with the assessment that, despite the risk of higher inflation, the level of interest rates following the June increase provided a good basis for further action. At its June and July meetings, the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) left its policy rate unchanged due to uncertainty surrounding the impact of the conflict in the Middle East on the long-term path of inflation in the US. In view of persistently higher energy prices, investors expect one increase in the Fed’s key policy rate this year, while one to two further 0.25 percentage point increases in the key ECB interest rates are expected.
Developments in financial markets since the beginning of July have been shaped primarily by the breakdown of the ceasefire between the US and Iran and by further disruptions to energy supplies. Yields on US and German government bonds increased over this period, amid stronger expectations that disruptions to energy supplies would accelerate price growth. At the same time, major global equity indices mostly increased, owing to the more favourable earnings results of large companies and renewed optimism regarding the growth of the artificial intelligence sector. The value of the US dollar declined since the beginning of July following the release of weaker US macroeconomic data, while oil and gold prices increased.
Economic growth in Slovenia significantly exceeded expectations in the second quarter; GDP increased by 1.8% quarter-on-quarter and by as much as 5.0% year-on-year. Robust growth continued to be driven primarily by domestic consumption and investment, particularly in construction, which was further supported by ongoing government infrastructure projects, while long-term lending also increased. Sustained real growth in the wage bill and favourable conditions in tourism contributed to a notable strengthening of services, while export growth also boosted activity in logistics. The growth of value added in manufacturing accelerated markedly despite challenging international conditions, with improvements observed across most sectors. Economic sentiment indicators and other high-frequency data suggest that growth will continue in the third quarter, although at a more moderate pace. Forecasting models currently estimate quarterly GDP growth at 0.5%.
International trade strengthened in the second quarter. The growth of nominal goods trade was strongly influenced by increased trade in petroleum and petroleum products. Otherwise, the year-on-year growth of goods exports was mainly driven by the pharmaceutical and automotive sectors. The growth of goods imports was particularly supported by imports of intermediate goods, reflecting frontloading in procurement and increased domestic production activity; price increases also had a significant impact on nominal growth. Service exports also strengthened, especially in transport services and travel. Data on the number of overnight stays by foreign tourists indicate a favourable tourist season. The 12-month current account surplus reached 3.6% of GDP, contributed exclusively by the services trade balance, while the goods trade balance was again in deficit.
In the labour market, the number of persons in employment remained stable over the summer months, while substantial differences across activities persisted. Employment in manufacturing continued to decline, while increasing in services. As economic activity picked up, firms’ employment expectations strengthened. However, labour shortages remain pronounced, prompting firms to continue hiring foreign workers. Unemployment remains at historically low levels. Wage growth strengthened to 8.3% in June, mainly reflecting the continued implementation of the public-sector pay reform. Amid stronger economic growth, labour productivity improved, while real wage growth remains high.
Headline inflation, as measured by the HICP, increased to 3.4% in August. It has thus remained above 3% since April this year. Price developments in recent months have been driven primarily by energy prices, particularly motor and liquid fuels, whose pronounced increase has been partly offset by government measures. However, food price growth remains relatively low for now, while higher energy prices and the exceptionally dry weather this summer pose significant upside risks. Some price pressures are already emerging along production chains, particularly for intermediate goods. Growth in other goods prices has nevertheless remained subdued, so that core inflation, i.e. inflation excluding energy and food prices, is almost entirely driven by services prices. In August, core inflation stabilised at 2.5%, while services inflation stood at 4.3%, supported by strong growth in labour costs and robust private consumption.
The deficit of the consolidated general government balance increased year-on-year despite solid revenue growth, reaching EUR 1.3 billion in the first seven months, which is approximately EUR 0.3 billion more than in the same period last year. Social security contributions recorded robust growth, while on the expenditure side, the wages and social security contributions of public sector employees, investment, and long-term care services stand out. The largest share of the deficit originates from the state budget, for which a budget revision is currently being prepared. Budgetary plans for the next two years are also in preparation, with the key challenge being to ensure the medium-term sustainability of government debt and expenditure control. Public finances remain exposed to numerous risks, including those related to defence expenditure, energy prices, demographic trends, the green transition, and post-flood reconstruction. Additional uncertainty arises from the potential implementation of measures under the Intervention Act to Promote the Development of Slovenia.
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In this issue, we take a closer look at energy shocks and their impact on the European and domestic economies, both of which are heavily dependent on energy imports. Through higher energy costs, energy shocks feed into inflation and weigh on economic activity by putting pressure on cost competitiveness and reducing households’ purchasing power and firms’ profitability. Their transmission to inflation and the economy varies across countries depending on market characteristics, regulation, tax policy and the energy intensity of production. Energy shocks also intensify competitive pressures from third countries that are more energy self-sufficient, while high energy prices may reduce the attractiveness of investment. Adapting to energy shocks therefore requires greater energy efficiency, economic restructuring and adequate sources of financing for the green transition. An analysis of bank financing shows that energy shocks do not encourage banks with greater exposure to carbon-intensive firms to finance investments in greater energy efficiency. This points to scope for further developing approaches to financing investments that reduce firms’ exposure to fluctuations in the prices of imported energy products.
However, adapting to energy shocks depends not only on the responses of firms and the financial system, but also on adequate support from economic policies. Monetary policy cannot fully offset the direct inflationary effects of energy shocks, but it can limit their persistence and contribute to anchoring inflation expectations. Fiscal measures have also helped mitigate price pressures during the two most recent energy crises, but at the same time increased the general government deficit. Greater fiscal flexibility at the EU level now gives countries more room for manoeuvre to support investment in energy resilience and the green transition. Economic policies can thus help mitigate the short-term effects of energy shocks and create the conditions needed for the economy to adapt over the longer term.
1International Environment
Global economic activity remained positive in the second quarter despite increased geopolitical uncertainty and strong energy price growth, while survey indicators suggest that it continued to expand at the beginning of the third quarter.
Economic growth in the major economies remained positive in the second quarter, even though geopolitical tensions and uncertainty remained elevated. In the United States (US), the economy grew by 0.4%, somewhat below market expectations. Private consumption was a positive surprise, strengthening after a weaker first quarter. Investment, particularly in artificial intelligence technologies, continued to make a significant contribution to growth, while the contributions of net exports and government consumption were negative. In the United Kingdom (UK), economic growth continued at 0.4%, slightly lower than in the previous quarter, when it stood at 0.6%. Growth was driven primarily by investment in information technology and private consumption. In Japan, economic growth surprised on the downside at 0.3%. Cost pressures related to the war in the Middle East contributed to weaker growth by dampening domestic demand. Amid heightened uncertainty, the contribution of investment was also negative, while exports contributed positively to growth. In China, economic growth slowed to 0.9%. Net exports remained the main driver of growth, while domestic demand remained weak.
According to survey indicators, global economic activity continued to grow at the beginning of the third quarter. The composite PMI increased to 52.6 index points in July, driven mainly by stronger growth in services, indicating an improvement in consumer confidence amid lower energy prices and, consequently, higher disposable income (Figure 1.1, left chart). By contrast, growth in manufacturing slowed slightly, partly owing to the fading effects of frontloading and lower inventory accumulation amid lower energy prices.[1] Nevertheless, the growth rate in manufacturing remains relatively high, supported by strong demand for artificial intelligence-related information technology. Pressures in global supply chains continued to ease in July, as reflected in lower input price pressures and a further decline in the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI, Figure 1.1, right chart).
Figure 1.1: Indicators of global economic developments
Sources: Bloomberg, GSCPI, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: July 2026.
The euro area economy remained resilient in the second quarter, while survey indicators point to continued growth in the third quarter.
The euro area economy proved more resilient than expected in the second quarter, as the deterioration in the near-term economic outlook indicated by survey indicators at the onset of the war in the Middle East did not materialise in economic activity. Excluding Ireland, the economy expanded by 0.3%, the same rate as in the first quarter, while growth in the euro area as a whole was 0.1 percentage points higher (Figure 1.2, left). According to monthly indicators, growth was driven mainly by services and manufacturing, while activity in construction and retail trade remained weak (Figure 1.2, right). Among the larger euro area economies, growth was highest in Spain, at 0.7%, while it stood at 0.3% in Germany and 0.2% in Italy, whereas economic activity stagnated in France.
The resilience of the euro area economy appears to have continued into the third quarter, according to survey indicators. These strengthened in July and August despite the renewed escalation of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and a renewed rise in energy prices. The composite PMI stood at 52.1 in August, with manufacturing activity expanding at its fastest pace since May 2022 and services activity continuing to grow steadily. Manufacturing activity was supported by stronger demand, partly related to frontloading and inventory building amid renewed geopolitical uncertainty. Additional support came from demand for technology products related to artificial intelligence and higher defence spending. The resilience of the euro area economy is also reflected in the ZEW indicator of economic sentiment, which rose in August to its highest level in six months and exceeded market expectations. Despite favourable current developments in activity and sentiment indicators, downside risks to growth remain elevated, particularly owing to uncertainty surrounding further geopolitical developments, as reflected in weak business confidence.
Figure 1.2: Indicators of economic developments in the euro area
Sources: Eurostat, Bloomberg, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data left: GDP – Q2 2026, PMI – August 2026, right: June 2026, services – May 2026.
Note: The right chart shows real indices: retail trade turnover excluding motor vehicles, industrial production, volume of construction works completed and services excluding financial activities, all adjusted for working days.
Headline inflation in the euro area strengthened in July, following renewed escalation of tensions in the Middle East.
Year-on-year price growth in the euro area, as measured by the HICP, increased by 0.1 percentage point to 2.9% in July (Figure 1.3, left). The uptick was driven by energy prices and core inflation, while food price growth declined. Energy prices were 10.3% higher in year-on-year terms, up from 8.5% in June when monthly declines were recorded due to lower global oil prices, which reflected improved prospects for conflict resolution in the Middle East. In addition to higher global market prices, refining costs and margins are once again also contributing significantly to energy inflation, while some fiscal measures implemented by the Member States to curb retail fuel prices also expired in June.[2]
Conversely, year-on-year food price growth continued to decline, reaching 1.2% (1.5% in June). Processed food inflation, standing at 0.7%, continued its months-long downward trend under the influence of previous moderation in global food commodity prices and year-on-year cheaper imported and domestic manufactured food products (Figure 1.3, right). Similarly, growth in unprocessed food prices slowed to 2.4%, which is 0.7 percentage points less than in June. This was driven by further moderation in year-on-year rates for fresh fruit, vegetables, and meat. In the coming months, higher cost pressures related to the ongoing increases in energy prices may be reflected in food prices; additional upside risks are posed by the effects of summer heatwaves and the occurrence of El Niño.
Core inflation, i.e. inflation measured excluding energy and food prices, increased by 0.1 percentage point to 2.5% in July. This is partially due to services inflation, which, at 3.3%, was 0.1 percentage point higher than in the previous month and has remained slightly above 3% for over a year. The limited movement continues to be accompanied by relatively stable domestic price pressures, while the newly published ECB indicators signal no major changes in the labour market up to the first quarter of 2027. Year-on-year growth in the prices of non-energy industrial goods (hereinafter: other goods) increased to 0.9% (0.7% in June) in continuation of their slightly higher growth, which coincides with increased pressures along the pricing chain (Figure 1.3, right).
In July, headline inflation in Slovenia was 0.1 percentage point higher than in the euro area. The difference was 0.8 percentage points lower than in June, mainly due to the moderation of the still larger contribution of energy prices in Slovenia, which resulted from the base effect dropping out of the year-on-year rate calculation for electricity and continued regulation of fuel prices. The difference in core inflation was the same, i.e. 0.1 percentage point. The range of headline inflation among the euro area Member States amounted to 3.4 percentage points. For the second consecutive month, Lithuania recorded the highest headline inflation (5.4%), while Estonia had the lowest (2.0%).
Figure 1.3: Euro area inflation and pipeline price pressures
Sources: Eurostat, ECB, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: left chart – July 2026; right chart – June 2026.
Note: In the right chart, the dashed lines represent year-on-year growth in import prices, while the non-dashed lines represent growth in producer prices for the domestic market.
Box 1.1: The role of monetary policy and the impact of monetary policy responses to energy shocks
Monetary policy cannot fully offset the short-term inflationary effects of an oil shock, but it can significantly contain its medium-term consequences.
The escalation of the conflict in the Middle East following the US attack on Iran in February this year triggered a sharp rise in oil prices and thus led to a negative supply shock for the euro area and Slovenia. As both economies are net importers of energy, higher energy prices worsen the terms of trade, reduce purchasing power and increase firms’ costs, thereby pushing up inflation while weighing on economic activity (see Boxes 3.4 and 5.1). This poses a particular challenge for monetary policy, as it primarily dampens inflationary pressures by restraining demand through higher interest rates, meaning that the scope for monetary policy to address the consequences of a supply shock is limited. At the same time, under the current circumstances this implies a trade-off between containing inflationary pressures on the one hand and limiting the adverse effects of the oil shock on economic activity on the other. In this box, we therefore use historical data to analyse the effects that oil supply shocks and monetary policy shocks have had on the euro area and Slovenian economies, as well as on firms’ expectations, since 2000.
We estimate the dynamic effects of these two types of shocks, namely oil supply shocks and monetary policy shocks, using the local projections method (Jordà, 2005), with both shocks identified outside the model using high-frequency data. Oil supply shocks are based on unexpected changes in oil futures prices around OPEC decision announcements (Känzig, 2021), while monetary policy shocks are based on surprises around ECB monetary policy announcements, purged of the information effect (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020).[3] Using this empirical approach, we first estimate the effects of both shocks on key macroeconomic aggregates and then on firms’ expectations.[4]
Monetary policy has limited scope to affect the short-term inflationary effects of oil shocks, as its impact on consumer prices strengthens only with a lag, when the initial inflationary effect of a transitory oil shock is already fading.
Both shocks reduce industrial production and increase unemployment, while affecting prices in opposite directions (Figure 1.1.1). An oil supply shock immediately raises the oil price and consumer prices (HICP), however, this price effect fades over time, in line with the predominantly transitory nature of the identified oil supply shocks in the sample under consideration. By contrast, a monetary policy tightening lowers both the oil price and consumer prices, although the effect on the latter materialises only gradually and with a certain lag. Unlike an oil shock, a monetary policy shock has more persistent effects on the level of consumer prices. Despite some differences, which also reflect a different time profile, the estimated effects on the Slovenian economy are broadly consistent with those presented for the euro area. This indicates a similar transmission of both shocks in Slovenia and the euro area, which is favourable from the perspective of the appropriateness of the common monetary policy response to conditions in the Slovenian economy.
Figure 1.1.1: Responses of macroeconomic variables to an oil supply shock and a monetary policy shock
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Sources: Eurostat, ECB, Känzig (2021), Jarociński and Karadi (2020), Banka Slovenije estimates and calculations.
Note: The charts show the estimated responses from local projections to an oil supply shock (Känzig, 2021) and to a monetary policy shock purged of the information component (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). The charts show the effects of one-standard-deviation shocks. The horizontal axis shows the number of months since the shock occurred. *The responses of the HICP, industrial production and the oil price are expressed as changes in logarithms multiplied by 100 and can be interpreted approximately as percentage changes, while the response of the unemployment rate is expressed in percentage points. The shaded areas show 90% confidence intervals.
The estimated macroeconomic responses also reveal a timing mismatch between the direct inflationary effect of a transitory oil shock and the effect of monetary policy on aggregate consumer prices. The impact of monetary policy on the HICP strengthens only with a lag, when the initial inflationary effect of the oil shock is already fading, while both shocks weigh on economic activity in the intervening period. This suggests that monetary policy has limited scope to affect the short-term inflationary effects of oil shocks, particularly when they are transitory in nature.[5] However, as monetary policy also affects the formation of expectations, we next examine how firms’ expectations respond to the two shocks.
The outbreak of war in Iran has already led to noticeable changes in expectations among euro area firms, which were most pronounced in the first months following the escalation of the conflict between the US and Iran. European Commission (EC) survey results show that between February and April 2026 firms raised their expectations for selling prices markedly, while at the same time lowering their expectations for future economic activity, consistent with the stagflationary nature of the oil shock. This effect had largely faded by the beginning of the second half of the year as tensions in the Middle East partially eased. Nevertheless, the volatile course of events highlights the importance of continuing to monitor the pass-through of the initial price pressures to firms’ expectations and broader inflationary pressures.
Monetary policy has a significant impact on firms’ price expectations, and this effect emerges more rapidly than the impact on consumer prices, in line with the expected sequence of monetary policy transmission.
The estimated responses of firms’ expectations with regard to the two shocks analysed are consistent with the estimated macroeconomic effects (Figure 1.1.2).[6] An oil supply shock initially raises firms’ selling price expectations, but this effect fades over time and becomes negative in the medium term. This reflects the fact that, with a certain lag, the oil shock also lowers firms’ expectations for activity and employment, thereby exerting downward pressure on price expectations. Meanwhile, a tightening of monetary policy delivered through higher interest rates lowers all three groups of firms’ expectations. From the perspective of containing inflationary pressures, a particularly important finding is that firms’ selling price expectations, in line with the expected sequence of monetary policy transmission, respond to monetary policy considerably faster than the macroeconomic aggregate of consumer prices (HICP). This suggests that even in the short term monetary policy can, at least to some extent, influence the emergence and propagation of inflationary pressures through its effect on firms’ price expectations.
Figure 1.1.2: Responses of euro area firms’ expectations to an oil supply shock and a monetary policy shock
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Sources: Eurostat, ECB, EC, Känzig (2021), Jarociński and Karadi (2020), Banka Slovenije estimates and calculations.
Note: The charts show the estimated responses from local projections to an oil supply shock (Känzig, 2021) and to a monetary policy shock purged of the information component (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). The charts show the effects of one-standard-deviation shocks. The horizontal axis shows the number of months since the shock occurred. The shaded areas show 90% confidence intervals.
In the short term, monetary policy counteracts the effects of an oil shock on price expectations, while in the medium term it amplifies them. Under such conditions, the monetary policy response may be excessive from the perspective of containing price pressures and restraining economic activity.
Extending the analysis to a more detailed level covering 48 industries in manufacturing and services shows that activities whose price expectations are more sensitive to oil supply shocks also tend to be more sensitive to monetary policy shocks (Figure 1.1.3). The sensitivity of each activity is measured by the maximum response of price expectations in the expected direction following each shock, separately for the short and medium term. In the short term, when the two shocks affect price expectations in opposite directions, their effects are negatively correlated. This means that the dampening effect of monetary policy tightening on price expectations tends to be stronger precisely in those activities where the oil shock raises them the most. In the medium term, when the estimated effect of the oil shock on price expectations turns negative, the correlation becomes positive. During this period, a restrictive monetary policy shock further amplifies the negative response of price expectations already caused by the oil shock.
Figure 1.1.3: Relationship between the effects of an oil supply shock and a monetary policy shock across activities
Sources: Eurostat, ECB, EC, Känzig (2021), Jarociński and Karadi (2020), Banka Slovenije estimates and calculations.
Note: For each activity, short-term sensitivity is calculated as the largest response of price expectations in the expected direction during the first 12 months after the shock, namely the largest positive response to an oil shock and the largest negative response to a monetary policy shock. Medium-term sensitivity is calculated for both types of shock as the largest negative response over the entire period (24 months).
Overall, the results presented in this box indicate that monetary policy is of limited effectiveness in mitigating the direct inflationary effects of moderate and transitory oil supply shocks.[7] Its impact on aggregate prices materialises fully only with a lag, when the initial inflationary pressure from the oil shock is already subsiding, while both shocks weigh on economic activity. In the medium term, restrictive monetary policy may also amplify the negative price effects of a transitory oil shock. However, these results do not necessarily imply that a monetary policy response to supply shocks is unwarranted. In the case of large and persistent shocks that could trigger second-round effects or a de-anchoring of inflation expectations, monetary policy becomes an important tool for limiting inflation persistence and preserving the anchoring of expectations. The key consideration is therefore to assess the persistence of the shock and the risk that the initial cost pressures spill over into broader and more persistent inflation.
2Monetary Policy, Financial Markets and Terms of Financing
2.1Monetary policy and financial markets
In June, the Eurosystem raised the interest rate on the marginal deposit facility to 2.25%, while the Fed left its policy rate unchanged within the corridor of 3.50% to 3.75% at its two most recent meetings.
In June, the ECB Governing Council raised all three key ECB interest rates by 0.25 percentage points. ECB experts assessed that the war in the Middle East was generating inflationary pressures. The decision to raise interest rates was also considered appropriate across a range of scenarios regarding the evolution of the price shock and its impact on the medium-term outlook for the euro area. At its July meeting, the Governing Council left the interest rates on the deposit facility, the main refinancing operations and the marginal lending facility unchanged at 2.25%, 2.40% and 2.65%, respectively. Given that the inflationary impact of the energy shock has not yet fully materialised, the Governing Council is paying particular attention to monitoring the intensity and duration of the shock, and its indirect and second-round effects.
At both its June and July meetings, the Fed left its key policy rate unchanged within the range of 3.50% to 3.75%, reflecting uncertainty surrounding the impact of the conflict in the Middle East on the long-term path of inflation in the US. Policy rates also remained unchanged at recent meetings in the UK (3.75%), Switzerland (0%), Canada (2.25%), Sweden (1.75%) and Australia (4.35%). At its June meeting, the Bank of Japan raised its policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to 1.00%, in response to persistently elevated inflationary pressures. At its July meeting, it left the rate unchanged.
Since June, expectations have strengthened that disruptions to energy supplies caused by the war in the Middle East will last longer than initially anticipated. Consequently, investors expect central banks to tighten their monetary policy stances. Current overnight index swap (OIS) rates indicate that financial markets now expect one to two further 0.25 percentage point increases in the key ECB interest rates by the end of 2026, which would bring the deposit facility rate to 2.75% (Figure 2.1.1, left). Since the beginning of July, expectations regarding monetary policy tightening by the Fed have decreased slightly, primarily due to somewhat weaker economic growth than previously expected. Nevertheless, market participants expect the Fed to raise its key policy rate by 0.25 percentage points this year, to a range of 3.75% to 4.00%.
Figure 2.1.1: Interest rate swap rate curves and government bond yields
Sources: Bloomberg, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: 31 August 2026.
The main global equity indices and yields on German and US government bonds have increased since the beginning of July. Energy prices remain elevated.
Amid heightened expectations of a more persistent increase in inflation and a more restrictive monetary policy stance by the ECB and the Fed, yields on German short-term government bonds have risen by 0.38 percentage points since the beginning of July, whereas yields on German long-term government bonds increased by 0.42 percentage points (Figure 2.1.1, right). Yields on US short-term treasuries similarly increased by 0.14 percentage points, while yields on US long-term treasuries rose by 0.24 percentage points. The increase in yields on US treasuries was constrained by recent releases of weaker than expected economic data. Spreads between yields on euro area bonds with higher credit risk and German government bonds narrowed, despite the continuing war in the Middle East, primarily due to more favourable economic data releases in the euro area. Consequently, investors expect fewer credit rating downgrades of European companies.
Major global equity indices have increased since the beginning of July despite geopolitical uncertainty (Figure 2.1.2, left). This was driven primarily by favourable second-quarter earnings releases by listed companies and by investor optimism regarding growth of the artificial intelligence sector. Consequently, the index comprising the seven largest US tech firms (the Magnificent Seven) has risen by 6.8% since the beginning of July, while the main US index, the S&P 500, has gained 2.8% and is currently close to the record levels reached in the first half of August. Similarly, the main European index, the STOXX Europe 600, has increased by 2.1% since the beginning of July, but currently stands 0.8% below its record level from the first half of August. The tech-oriented Hang Seng index in Hong Kong gained 11.3% over the period, reflecting increased optimism in the tech sector.
The value of the US dollar against the euro has declined by 1.5% since the beginning of July, primarily owing to less favourable US labour market data releases, intervention by the US government in support of the Japanese yen, and the Treasury’s announcement of a programme to purchase long-term US sovereign bonds, which raised investor concerns regarding US fiscal credibility. The value of the dollar against a basket of the major global currencies followed a similar path and currently stands 1.6% below its level at the beginning of July (Figure 2.1.2, right). The price of gold has increased by 10.6% since the beginning of July, while the price of Brent crude oil has risen by 24.1%, following the breakdown of the ceasefire between the US and Iran and further disruptions to energy supplies.
Figure 2.1.2: Developments in equity indices, the euro and the US dollar
Sources: Bloomberg, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: 31 August 2026.
Note: In the left chart the Magnificent Seven comprise Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla. In the right chart DXY measures the US dollar against a basket of six currencies (EUR, JPY, GBP, CAD, SEK, CHF) based on trade weights, with the euro having the largest weight at 57%. NEER41 denotes the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro against 41 trading partners. The EUR/USD exchange rate indicates the movement of the euro against the US dollar, where a higher value denotes a stronger euro and vice versa.
2.2Credit activity and financing conditions
Credit activity in Slovenia remains stronger than in the euro area, particularly for households.
Annual growth in loans to households reached 8.5% in July, compared with 3.1% in the euro area, with the difference mainly driven by housing loans, which grew by 9.7% in Slovenia and 3% in the euro area (Figure 2.2.1). Despite strong loan growth, the latest Bank Lending Survey (BLS) data point to a decline in demand for housing loans in both economies, which could translate into a gradual moderation in credit growth over the coming months. The decline in demand also reflects higher borrowing costs following the recent upward turn in interest rates and points to a possible moderation in housing market activity.
Figure 2.2.1: Lending and loan demand
Sources: ECB, BSI, Bank Lending Survey (BLS). Latest data left: July 2026, right: Q2 2026.
Note: The left chart shows loan data based on the ECB’s harmonised monetary financial institution (MFI) statistics and presents adjusted annual growth rates, excluding the effects of changes in stocks that are not related to transactions. Loans are reported on a gross basis, i.e. before impairments, and may therefore differ from supervisory reporting data used in other Banka Slovenije publications. The right chart shows net changes in loan demand reported by banks in the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) relative to the previous quarter. The net change is defined as the difference between the share of banks reporting an increase in demand and the share reporting a decrease. For households, the data refer to demand for housing loans.
Growth in loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) is also higher in Slovenia than in the euro area (Figure 2.2.1). In July, annual growth stood at 6.9%, compared with 4.4% in the euro area. In Slovenia, long-term loans grew more strongly (7.6%) than short-term loans with a maturity of up to one year (0.4%), while the opposite was observed in the euro area (3.9% and 7.3%, respectively). The difference partly reflects base effects, as growth in short-term loans in Slovenia was higher last year, while growth in long-term loans was low or negative. Despite the strengthening of long-term lending, this cannot be directly linked to corporate investment activity, as previous analyses for Slovenia point to a relatively weak causal relationship between investment and bank lending.[8]
Following the previous decline, lending and deposit rates have turned upwards in recent months, while borrowing conditions for households in Slovenia remain more favourable than in the euro area.
The upward turn in lending rates reflects a shift in expectations regarding the future path of the ECB’s key interest rates and their increase in June (Figure 2.2.2, left). In Slovenia, the interest rate on new housing loans stood at 3.1% in June, remaining below the euro area rate of 3.5%, while the rate on new loans to NFCs, at 3.9%, was broadly in line with the euro area average of 3.8%. Despite the recent upward turn, the cost of new borrowing in Slovenia thus remains relatively favourable, particularly for households.
Figure 2.2.2: Lending and deposit rates
Sources: ECB, MIR. Latest data: June 2026.
Note: Interest rates are shown for new business. In the left chart, lending rates for households refer to housing loans. In the right chart, deposit rates refer to household deposits.
An upward turn has also been observed in deposit rates in recent months, although they remain considerably lower in Slovenia than in the euro area (Figure 2.2.2, right). The interest rate on new household term deposits stood at 1.3%, compared with 2.1% in the euro area, while overnight deposits were remunerated at 0.08% and 0.28%, respectively. As with lending rates, the renewed increase in deposit rates is related to changing expectations regarding monetary policy and the increase in the ECB’s key interest rates in June. Lower deposit rates in Slovenia reduce households’ incentives to shift funds into term deposits and allow banks to maintain relatively favourable deposit funding costs. This is further supported by the structure of household deposits, with overnight deposits accounting for 87% of total household deposits in Slovenia, compared with 56% in the euro area.
3Domestic Economic Activity
The acceleration of GDP growth in the second quarter was broadly based on both the demand and supply sides, with manufacturing performing better than expected given the uncertain international environment.
In the second quarter, economic conditions were better than expected, especially considering the heightened geopolitical tensions. GDP growth accelerated again, reaching 1.8% quarter-on-quarter and 5.0% year-on-year, significantly outpacing the euro area average. Domestic demand factors continued to dominate the growth structure, while stronger exports also contributed to favourable production results in manufacturing.
All components of domestic demand contributed to strong GDP growth, with investment in fixed assets once again providing the most significant boost. For the second consecutive quarter, these investments were up 13.2% year-on-year. Within this category, construction investment remained dominant, largely linked to government infrastructure projects, which this year have been influenced by local elections and the completion of EU funding from the Recovery and Resilience Plan. Despite high uncertainty, investment in equipment and machinery also increased considerably, accompanied by stronger long-term lending (see also subsection 2.2). Together with higher investment in intellectual property, this is favourable for the economy’s development potential. Private consumption was further strengthened by solid labour market conditions and continued real growth in the wage bill, with households notably increasing purchases of durable goods – most prominently, the number of passenger car registrations rose by 12.7% year-on-year. Final consumption was also visibly supported by the government, driven by the implementation of long-term care entitlements and additional hiring in this sector. Amid robust domestic consumption, strong import growth was a key factor behind the negative contribution of net trade to GDP growth (Figure 3.1, left).
Figure 3.1: GDP growth structure
Source: SURS. Latest data: Q2 2026.
Strong domestic demand and more favourable exports resulted in high value-added growth across most activity groups (Figure 3.1, right). Construction continued to stand out, with value added up 15.9% year-on-year. Activity increased in all segments, most notably in civil engineering. Private services accelerated, among them logistics benefited from stronger goods trade. At the same time, demand in the domestic market was further supported by growth in tourism. Value added in public services also continued to strengthen. In a challenging international environment, manufacturing surprised with a strong rebound. Compared with the first quarter, year-on-year value added growth accelerated by 3.5 percentage points to 4.3% – the highest since the end of 2024. Compared with the beginning of the year, conditions improved in most sectors, including energy-intensive ones. Among sectors, the pharmaceutical industry made a significant contribution to the overall acceleration in production (for a longer-term perspective on manufacturing activities, see Box 3.3).
According to preliminary data, favourable economic conditions continued in July and August.
Business confidence improved noticeably after declining with the outbreak of war in the Middle East (Figure 3.2, left). The value of the economic sentiment indicator edged down slightly in August, but remained above this year’s and last year’s averages. Confidence remains high in private services, including trade, where companies assess current and expected sales very positively. It is also stable in construction, although in recent months there has been more caution in estimates of expected orders. Conditions in manufacturing remain solid given the challenging international environment. In August, confidence declined somewhat due to higher inventories and less favourable assessments of expected production, but evaluations of export and total orders improved again.
In August, consumers were more cautious in their assessments of future financial and economic conditions and major purchases, but their confidence remained significantly higher than a year ago. Continued robust spending in the domestic market during the summer months is also indicated by the real values of card payments and ATM withdrawals, as well as tax-confirmed receipts in July (Figure 3.2, right). The first was up 4.0% year-on-year, and the second by 5.1%, both exceeding the average growth in the second quarter. For the same month, solid economic conditions are also reflected in increased retail sales, the number of tourist overnight stays, and building permits.
Figure 3.2: Economic sentiment and high-frequency consumption indicators
Sources: SURS, FURS, Bankart, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data left: August 2026, right: July 2026.
Note: In the right chart, the HICP deflator is used to calculate real growth.
Box 3.1: Nowcasts for GDP growth in the third quarter
The average estimate from the set of nowcasting models indicates quarterly GDP growth of 0.5% in the third quarter.
In addition to autonomous model dynamics and strong quarterly real GDP growth in the second quarter, the current estimate (Figure 3.1.1, left) reflects mixed developments in economic sentiment in the first two months of the third quarter. The 0.6 percentage point improvement in July was driven mainly by higher confidence in manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, among consumers and in retail trade, while confidence in services deteriorated. In August, economic sentiment deteriorated by 0.7 percentage points, primarily owing to lower confidence in manufacturing and among consumers. The deterioration was partly mitigated by higher confidence in services and, to a lesser extent, in retail trade.
A more significant adjustment to the estimate of quarterly GDP growth is expected in September, when July data for key monthly indicators of economic activity will be released, including industrial production, the value of construction put in place, and the volume of activity in services and trade.
The limited amount of information available from high-frequency indicators is also reflected in the histogram of the nowcast distribution (Figure 3.1.1, right). The range of estimates, based on the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution, currently stands at between 0.3% and 0.9%.
Figure 3.1.1: Nowcasts for economic growth
Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije calculations.
Notes: The left chart shows the nowcasts for quarterly GDP growth. The gold area represents the interval between the 25th and 75th percentiles, while the green area represents the interval between the lowest and highest nowcasts. The line indicates the average nowcast of quarterly GDP growth for the third quarter of 2026. The right chart illustrates the distribution of the nowcasts for quarterly GDP growth in the third quarter of 2026. The vertical gold line represents the median, and the red line the mean. The relative frequency represents the share of the total set of models yielding a particular growth nowcast. Nowcast date: 26 August 2026.
Box 3.2: First annual estimate of national accounts for 2025
The first annual estimate of GDP growth for 2025 is 0.4 percentage points higher compared with estimates based on quarterly data sources.
On 31 August 2026, the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia published the first annual estimate of national accounts for 2025. Compared with the previous estimate based on quarterly data sources, last year’s GDP growth was revised upwards by 0.4 percentage points, to 1.5%.
On the expenditure side, changes were evident in most aggregates, most notably in government final consumption, where growth was revised upwards by 1.6 percentage points to 3.2%. Growth in gross fixed capital formation was also increased, from 4.1% to 5.3%, and private consumption rose somewhat more strongly than initially estimated. In line with higher growth in expenditure aggregates, import growth was revised upwards by 0.7 percentage points to 2.8%. Export growth did not change significantly. Inventories were also minimally adjusted, contributing 0.4 percentage points to last year’s GDP growth (Figure 3.2.1, left).
Value added growth was also more favourable than indicated by quarterly data, rising from 1.1% to 1.5% after considering companies’ annual financial statements. The new data show weaker conditions in industry, slightly lower growth in construction, and improved conditions in services. The latter is consistent with stronger final consumption in the domestic market. Value added growth in private services was thus revised upwards to 2.9%, and in public services to 2.7% (Figure 3.2.1, right).
Figure 3.2.1: Changes in the growth of real GDP components in 2025
Source: SURS.
Quarterly data aligned with the published first annual estimate of national accounts for 2025 will be released by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia on 23 September. Therefore, it is not yet possible to calculate the new effect of last year’s economic growth carry-over into this year. This will be presented in the October edition of the publication.
Box 3.3: Energy supply conditions and their impact on manufacturing activities
Final energy consumption in Slovenia is gradually decreasing, but the share of fossil fuels remains dominant.
Analysis of the energy balance shows that final energy consumption in Slovenia has gradually decreased since 2008, mainly due to technological progress, restructuring in industry, and greater efficiency in households. In 2024, it was 17.3% lower compared with 2008.[9] The main constraint is transport, where energy consumption in 2024 was 3.7% above the average for the observed period. Transport thus remains the largest energy consumer, with Slovenia serving as an important transport hub with highly developed logistics, dispersed settlement, and insufficiently developed public transport. Domestic energy production, on the other hand, has been declining in the long term due to the phasing out of coal-based production. At the same time, the share of fossil fuels in final consumption in 2024 was 59.8%. This is 5.4 percentage points lower than in 2008, but at the level of the average for the observed period. This implies considerable exposure to external risks in today’s environment of heightened geopolitical tensions and instability in energy markets.
The energy intensity of the economy is decreasing due to technological progress and industrial restructuring, but this has not yet affected energy dependence on imports.
The energy intensity of the economy, measured as energy consumption per unit of value added, is decreasing, especially in manufacturing, where the indicator value in 2024, at 3.8 TJ per million value added, was almost half that of 2008 (Figure 3.3.1, left). Energy-intensive sectors contributed significantly to this, but at the cost of reduced production volume. Meanwhile, energy dependence, measured as the ratio of net imports to total energy supply, is not decreasing and, amid annual fluctuations in domestic production – mostly due to hydrological conditions and maintenance works at the nuclear power plant – remains close to 50% (Figure 3.3.1, right). This means that domestic sources provide only about half of the required energy.
Figure 3.3.1: Energy intensity and import dependence
Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije calculations.
Note: In the right chart, data for 2025 are provisional. Energy intensity is measured as final energy consumption in TJ per million real value added. Energy dependence is the ratio of net imports to total energy supply. Total energy supply consists of domestic production and net imports. Time series with a constant base year 2020 are used for value added. 1 TJ (terajoule) = 277.8 MWh.
Current challenges in manufacturing, especially in energy-intensive sectors, coincide with a period of high energy prices.
High electricity and natural gas prices after 2021, along with other adverse factors, have negatively affected the performance of manufacturing, especially energy-intensive sectors.[10] Focusing only on the cost aspect, and according to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, in the first quarter of this year the average electricity price for non-household consumers was 76.5% higher than the average for the period 2012–2021, and the price of natural gas was 59.4% higher, with prices beginning to rise sharply already in the second half of 2021.
Energy-intensive sectors have faced a noticeable decline in production since the onset of the energy crisis, although this trend is not limited to them. Despite at least temporary improvements in recent months, the gap in annual production compared with the peak reached after 2020 remains substantial and is present in most manufacturing activities. In energy-intensive sectors, the gap in June amounted to 17.2% overall, ranging from 7.3% in metal production to 23.7% in paper production (Figure 3.3.2). The total shortfall in manufacturing was 3.7%, and 2.0% excluding energy-intensive sectors.
Figure 3.3.2: Energy intensity and manufacturing production
Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije estimates and calculations.
Note: In the chart, arrows indicate a break in the scale on the right axis. Total production of energy-intensive sectors and pharmaceutical production are estimated using shares in value added.
Challenges in manufacturing are already affecting the labour market. In energy-intensive sectors, the total number of employed persons has been declining year-on-year since April 2023. In June this year, the decrease reached 3.3%, with the most pronounced reduction, 6.3%, in paper production, and the smallest, 1.3%, in chemical production. The decline in the aggregate of other sectors, which has persisted since the end of 2024, slowed this year and amounted to 0.8% in June. Difficult conditions in manufacturing are also the main factor behind the overall reduction in the number of employed persons in the country (Figure 3.3.3, left).
The withdrawal of domestic energy-intensive and other production puts pressure on the goods trade balance. Excluding pharmaceutical industry products due to the large volume of processing trade, and according to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, the annual trade balance of manufacturing products shifted from a small surplus at the beginning of 2021 to a deficit of EUR 10.9 billion by June this year. During this period, the annual deficit in the trade of products from energy-intensive sectors increased by EUR 8.6 billion to EUR 9.5 billion (Figure 3.3.3, right).[11] Alongside reduced domestic production, rising prices have also contributed significantly to the increase in the deficit. This is indicated by the weighted index of total producer prices in domestic energy-intensive sectors, which in June was 36.6% above the average for the first half of 2021, that is, before the onset of rapid energy price increases.
Figure 3.3.3: Employment and goods trade in manufacturing products
Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: June 2026.
Note: In the right chart, for greater clarity, pharmaceutical industry products are excluded from the total goods trade in manufacturing products in two cases. The reason is the significant impact of processing trade, which obscures goods trade as it does not directly relate to production. Processing trade also has a major influence on the trade balance of chemical products, which are classified as energy-intensive. The goods trade balance is presented according to the NACE classification.
To preserve the domestic industrial base and achieve a sustainable reduction in emissions, an appropriate balance between the cost aspect of the energy transition and global competitiveness of production will be crucial.
The developments in production and goods trade presented in the box increase import dependence on certain key groups of products essential for the normal functioning of the economy and society, such as toilet, household, hygiene, and office supplies, plastics, fertilisers, paints, disinfectants, detergents, and toiletries, explosives, wooden boards, veneer, construction furniture, glass, ceramics, bricks, insulation materials, cement, concrete, iron, steel, and aluminium.
Increased cost pressures have contributed to the reduced competitiveness of Slovenian exporters in international markets and heightened adverse risks to the long-term sustainability of the industrial base. Such challenges are characteristic of the entire EU (see Box 5.1), where high energy prices represent a significant structural barrier to economic competitiveness. This particularly affects energy-intensive activities, reducing their price competitiveness and investment attractiveness. As a result, the risk of shifting production and new investments to environments with more favourable cost conditions is increasing.[12] It should be emphasised that high energy prices are only one of the inhibiting factors for the competitiveness of Slovenia and the EU.
The shift towards further reductions in final energy consumption, energy intensity, and import dependence is a long-term process that is technologically, infrastructurally, and financially demanding, as it requires restructuring final consumption, increasing domestic production without fossil fuels, and a thorough transformation of the energy infrastructure (see also Box 3.5). In an environment of strong global competition, external price competitiveness and reliability of energy supply are fundamental factors for the stable functioning of society and prerequisites for achieving cyclical macroeconomic stability, addressing long-term structural challenges, and restructuring the economy. Achieving a balance between the cost aspect of the energy transition and the external competitiveness of domestic industry should therefore become one of the central guiding principles of economic policy both domestically and in the EU. Easing international geopolitical tensions would greatly facilitate the achievement of this balance.
Box 3.4: The implications of the drivers of crude oil price increases for inflation and economic activity
Understanding the causes of the increase is key to assessing the macroeconomic implications of higher oil prices, as supply and demand shocks have different effects on inflation and economic activity.
The recent sharp rise in crude oil prices reflects a combination of supply-side constraints and still relatively strong global demand. Supply constraints are linked to the war in the Middle East and restrictions on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil shipping routes. At the same time, still relatively robust global economic activity is keeping demand for oil high. As the macroeconomic effects of higher oil prices depend on the factors driving the increase, the first part of the box estimates their contributions to oil price developments this year, while the second assesses their combined effects on real GDP and inflation in Slovenia.
The structural shocks are identified using a quarterly global oil market VAR model that includes global economic activity, global crude oil production, the price of crude oil and global crude oil inventories. By imposing sign restrictions following Kilian and Murphy (2014), we distinguish between oil supply shocks, global aggregate demand shocks and oil inventory demand shocks, with the latter capturing changes in the desired inventory holdings arising from precautionary or speculative motives.
The decomposition of Brent crude oil price developments into structural drivers shows that negative oil supply shocks and robust global demand contributed to its increase after the outbreak of the conflict to a broadly similar extent (Figure 3.4.1). The current increase therefore cannot be regarded as an isolated supply shock (the effects of an oil supply shock in Slovenia and the euro area are also presented in Box 1.1). Strong global demand may mitigate the decline in economic activity that typically follows a negative supply shock, but at the same time further increase the persistence of energy price growth and broader inflationary pressures.
Figure 3.4.1: Decomposition of crude oil price developments
Sources: ECB, Banka Slovenije calculations.
Note: In the left chart, the contributions of the identified structural shocks to the year-on-year rate of change in the Brent crude oil price are shown, while the right chart presents the main drivers of the increase in oil prices in 2026.
The effects on the Slovenian economy are estimated using a block-exogenous VAR model following the approach in Peersman and Van Robays (2012). The global block includes global economic activity, global crude oil production, the price of crude oil and global crude oil inventories, while the Slovenian block includes the quarterly growth rates of real GDP and the HICP. The global block is strictly exogenous with respect to the Slovenian economy: global shocks may affect Slovenian variables contemporaneously and with a lag, while feedback from the Slovenian economy to the global oil market is ruled out. The quarterly responses of GDP growth are cumulated and expressed as percentage deviations of its level from the no-shock path, while the responses of HICP growth are converted into effects on year-on-year inflation, expressed in percentage points. To ensure comparability, the structural shocks are normalised such that each causes a 10% increase in the real oil price on impact.
For the same increase in oil prices, a negative supply shock has a smaller and more short-lived inflationary effect and lowers the level of real GDP, while higher oil prices stemming from a global demand shock raise inflation more markedly and persistently and increase the level of real GDP.
The initial inflationary increase is primarily consistent with the direct pass-through of higher crude oil prices to the prices of motor and other liquid fuels. The inflationary effect then fades relatively quickly as the response of oil prices moderates, while weaker economic activity partly contains broader indirect price pressures and second-round effects. The level of real GDP declines owing to the adverse impact of higher energy costs on production and the reduction in households’ real disposable income (Figure 3.4.2).
Figure 3.4.2: Responses of the level of real GDP and year-on-year HICP inflation in Slovenia to global oil market shocks
Source: Banka Slovenije calculations.
Note: The shocks are normalised such that they cause a 10% increase in the real price of crude oil on impact. The response of the level of real GDP in the left chart is expressed as a percentage deviation from the no-shock path, while the response of year-on-year HICP inflation in the right chart is expressed in percentage points. The solid lines show the point estimates, while the shaded areas denote 90% uncertainty bands. The horizontal axis shows the number of quarters since the shock occurred.
This year’s rise in oil prices may lead to more persistent inflationary pressures but a less pronounced slowdown in economic activity.
The estimates indicate that this year’s rise in oil prices reflects the simultaneous effects of global demand factors and oil supply constraints. Although oil supply constraints are expected to raise inflation only temporarily and dampen economic activity in Slovenia, the contribution from global demand may amplify the impact on inflation and mitigate the negative effect on GDP. Based on the estimated structural shocks in the first and second quarters of 2026, their combined contribution to inflation this year is estimated at approximately 0.7 percentage points, while their contribution to annual real GDP growth is estimated at around –0.1 percentage points. The main risks surrounding these estimates relate to the duration and intensity of supply disruptions and the extent to which their price effects are amplified by persistent global demand and precautionary inventory accumulation in the oil market.
Box 3.5: The role of the banking system and the impact of the energy shock on credit supply
The energy shock does not induce banks with greater exposure to carbon-intensive firms to increase financing for decarbonisation.
The euro area economy’s high dependence on energy imports increases its exposure to external energy and geopolitical shocks. The latter are transmitted through higher energy costs to inflation, reduce households’ real income and firms’ profitability, and dampen economic activity and investment, while also weakening the competitiveness of energy-intensive firms (see Boxes 3.4, 5.1 and 6.1). Decarbonisation reduces emissions and can strengthen economic resilience. Greater energy efficiency and a higher share of domestic low-carbon energy sources reduce dependence on global energy prices. Model-based and empirical analyses for euro area countries show that more decarbonised economies can mitigate the impact of such shocks on their economic activity, electricity prices and, consequently, headline inflation.[13]
Decarbonisation can also help firms reduce their exposure to future energy shocks, raising the question of whether they have sufficient financial resources available to make such adjustments. The role of bank financing in the green transition of euro area firms is examined in the Banka Slovenije analysis by Neža Ahčin (2025), The Impact of Credit Supply on Firms’ Green Transition in the Euro Area, which investigates how changes in bank credit supply affect the growth in firms’ carbon intensity, measured as the ratio of direct greenhouse gas emissions to revenue.
When assessing the impact of lending activity, a key challenge is to disentangle credit supply from firms’ demand for financing. A decline in lending to a particular firm may reflect either tighter lending conditions imposed by the bank or lower demand by the firm, for example due to less favourable investment opportunities.[14]
The results of the analysis show that greater credit supply does not necessarily lead to faster decarbonisation. In the short term, a one percentage point increase in credit supply is associated with a 0.01 percentage point higher growth rate of carbon intensity. This shows that firms use additional available funds primarily to expand production and operations, but the estimated responses vary considerably between firms. The effect of greater credit availability on decarbonisation is more favourable for firms that were initially less carbon-intensive[15] and for those operating in sectors with greater capacity or potential for greening.[16] A one percentage point higher growth rate of credit supply reduces carbon intensity growth by 0.07 percentage points for less carbon-intensive firms and by 0.03 percentage points for more carbon-intensive firms with greening potential. The results thus suggest that the green transition depends not only on the amount of financing, but also on its allocation to firms with feasible technological options for reducing emissions.
These results raise the question of how euro area banks adjust lending in the face of energy shocks, when pressures or economic incentives for firms to reduce energy dependence increase. Energy price shocks increase the returns on investment in energy efficiency, but at the same time raise the credit risk of firms that are more exposed to such shocks. This is particularly relevant for banks with greater exposures to these firms. An econometric approach based on local projections allows us to identify whether, following an energy shock, banks with greater pre-existing exposure to carbon-intensive firms increase their lending relatively more to firms with greening potential.
Following the approach in Jordà (2005),[17] we estimate the impulse responses of credit supply to an energy shock using the following model[18]