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Review of macroeconomic developments, March 2026

Review of macroeconomic developments, March 2026

Table of contents

Summary

Following a relatively favourable economic performance at the end of last year, domestic demand in Slovenia has moderated at the beginning of this year; meanwhile, risks to economic activity and inflation have increased amid the escalation of the war in the Middle East.

Economic growth in the euro area, which at the end of last year was being driven by domestic demand, has continued at the beginning of this year. However, risks stemming from developments in the Middle East are increasing. Survey indicators suggest that this year economic activity continues to be supported primarily by services, while conditions are also improving in manufacturing, where the PMI indicator in February (which does not yet reflect the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East) rose above the growth threshold for the first time in six months. Despite the improvement in business sentiment, the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East at the beginning of March has heightened risks to economic growth and price stability. This deterioration comes after, according to the latest available data, headline euro area inflation remained below the monetary policy target at 1.9% in February, while core inflation increased to 2.4% amid persistent price pressures in the service sector. An uptick is already expected in March due to a sharp rise in energy prices following the disruptions to global oil and gas supplies.

The ECB and Fed left their key interest rates unchanged at their latest meetings. The Governing Council of the ECB justified its decision by assessing that inflation will stabilise at the 2% target over the medium term, while in the case of Fed, more encouraging data from the US labour market contributed to the maintenance of its policy stance. Following the outbreak of war in the Middle East, market expectations regarding further reductions in the Fed’s key interest rate have somewhat diminished, whereas expectations of a possible earlier increase of 25 basis points in the ECB’s key interest rates have strengthened.

Developments in international financial markets were broadly stable in February. At the beginning of March volatility increased following the outbreak of war in the Middle East. US treasury yields and German government bond yields increased in early March amid heightened expectations that disruptions in energy supply would push inflation higher. Conversely, major global equity indices declined as investors fled towards safer assets, while the US dollar appreciated.

At the end of last year, economic developments in Slovenia were relatively favourable, primarily owing to stronger domestic demand; however, according to initial data, this momentum has been easing in the first months of this year. In the final quarter of last year, year-on-year GDP growth reached 2.0%, with the continuation of the government investment cycle and stronger private consumption, supported by the introduction of the mandatory Christmas bonus and the payment of the winter allowance for pensioners, providing the largest contributions. Foreign demand remained weak by contrast, as did exports and activity in manufacturing. At the start of this year, survey data suggests that conditions for exporters remained challenging. At the same time some signs of a moderation in domestic consumption are emerging. Real growth in card payment values has slowed, the value of fiscally verified invoices has declined, and survey assessments of demand in construction and services were somewhat weaker in February. Based on the available set of indicators, nowcasting models point to 0.5% quarterly economic growth in the first quarter.

Amid weak foreign demand and challenging conditions for exporters, the merchandise trade balance recorded a deficit last year. This has occurred only once in the past decade, during the energy crisis in 2022. Real merchandise exports declined last year, reflecting the impact of global trade policy developments on global demand and a further deterioration in external competitiveness. In contrast, real merchandise imports increased significantly, supported by robust domestic demand, particularly in the second half of the year. The current account remained in surplus (3.4% of GDP), solely due to the surplus in services trade, which further strengthened relative to the previous year. Initial indicators for this year suggest a continued contraction in merchandise exports, and the outlook remains unfavourable, as manufacturing firms did not report any significant increase in export orders in February.

At the end of last year, the divergence between the public and private sectors in the labour market continued. After declining for a year, the number of persons in employment increased year-on-year in December (by 0.3%), primarily as a result of hiring in the public sector. However, on average over the year it decreased due to contractions in the private sector, particularly in manufacturing. Registered unemployment at the beginning of this year was down in year-on-year terms, but remained above last year’s average. The average gross wage was down in year-on-year terms (by 0.5%) in December, its first fall in a long time, largely as a result of smaller extraordinary payments at the end of the year, which firms most likely replaced in part with the mandatory Christmas bonus. The gap between the public and private sectors widened: wages in the latter fell, while the former saw growth of almost 10%.

Headline inflation as measured by the HICP rose to 2.8% in February. This was largely driven by energy prices, particularly a one-off base effect in electricity prices, which had been significantly reduced by government measures in February last year. Food price inflation remains elevated at 4.3%, but is continuing its moderate slowdown in line with the stabilisation of conditions on global food markets and among euro area producers. Weak demand and moderate external price factors were also reflected in slower growth in prices of other goods, which led to a decline in core inflation to 2.3%. Service price inflation strengthened by contrast, consistent with strong growth in labour costs.

The consolidated general government deficit increased to 2.5% of GDP last year, just over a percentage point higher than a year earlier. The increase reflects the moderation in economic growth and the effects of the public sector wage system reform. Towards the end of the year, investment growth accelerated, employees received a mandatory Christmas bonus, and pensioners received a winter allowance, both for the first time. The surplus in January was lower than in the same period last year. Social security contributions continued to make the largest contribution to revenue growth, while wages were the main driver on the expenditure side. According to the government plans, the deficit is forecast to widen even further this year, despite the projected rise in economic growth, which is reducing the space for fiscal policy to act countercyclically.

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In this edition we provide a more detailed analysis of the macrofinancial environment in Slovenia and the extent to which it supports or constrains corporate investment. Our findings indicate that over the past decade investment by Slovenian firms has lagged behind that of comparable euro area countries, despite lower corporate indebtedness and similar financing conditions. This gap is particularly evident in investment in intellectual property. In this context, access to finance has not shown to be a key constraint. Instead, firms identify uncertainty and unpredictability in the business environment, shortages of skilled labour, and cost-related and tax-administrative burdens as the most significant factors limiting investment.

Although financing remains one of the least restrictive factors for corporate investment, the structure of the macrofinancial environment still falls short in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and in fostering innovation and the digital transformation of the economy. Firms still see banks as supportive in traditional types of investment, such as machinery and equipment, and real estate. Looking ahead, the expected composition of corporate investment in the medium term poses a risk of the continuation of the long-standing trend of a declining role of the banking system in corporate financing, observed in Slovenia since the debt crisis. The gradual reduction in the importance of bank financing also poses a challenge for economic policymakers, particularly in the area of monetary policy, as it may weaken their ability to ensure price and financial stability through the bank lending channel.

1International Environment

According to survey data, global economic growth has continued at the beginning of this year. The escalation of tensions in the Middle East, changes in trade policy in the United States, and the resulting heightened uncertainty represent the main risk going forward.

In the final quarter of last year, economic activity increased across major economies, albeit unevenly. In the United States current economic growth continued but slowed to 0.4% (previously 1.1%), mainly due to the federal government shutdown and a lower contribution from net exports. Private consumption remained the main driver of growth, although it moderated somewhat, while investment also made a significant contribution. Economic activity in the United Kingdom was virtually unchanged (0.1%), with modest growth primarily underpinned by a recovery in manufacturing amid stagnation in services. In Japan economic activity – following a decline in the third quarter – increased only marginally, by 0.1%, while domestic demand remains weak. The same applies to China, where growth strengthened mainly due to a higher contribution from net exports (1.2%, up from 1.1%).

Global economic growth has continued this year, as confirmed by the composite PMI, which rose to 53.3 index points in February[1] (Figure 1.1, left). Activity continues to be driven primarily by services, while conditions in manufacturing have also improved, as reflected in greater business optimism. The easing of trade-related risks has also contributed in part to more favourable conditions, as indicated by an increase in new export orders following ten months of pronounced decline.

Due to the escalation of tensions in the Middle East and the spread of military conflict to other countries, the risks to inflation and economic activity have increased significantly. The sharp rise in the global geopolitical risk indicator[2] (Figure 1.1, right) also confirms the increase in geopolitical risk. The escalation of the conflict is most directly reflected in rising energy prices, particularly for oil and liquefied natural gas. A key factor is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important maritime routes for energy exports, through which approximately 25% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of global liquefied natural gas shipments pass. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure are also contributing to higher prices. European liquefied natural gas prices are currently around 60% higher, while oil prices have increased by approximately 20%.[3]

Uncertainty surrounding trade policy has also increased somewhat in the international environment, following the decision of the US Supreme Court to overturn the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act as the legal basis for most of the tariff measures introduced by the US administration last year. In response the administration imposed a temporary additional tariff rate of 10% under Section 122 of the Trade Act, with the possibility of an increase to 15% for a period of up to 150 days,[4] while simultaneously seeking to establish a more permanent legal basis for maintaining previously agreed tariff rates. These changes temporarily alter the relative tariff burden between countries. Economies that were previously subject to the highest tariffs, such as China and Brazil, will be relatively less affected during this period, while countries with previously more favourable arrangements – particularly the United Kingdom and the EU – will see a reduction in their relative trade advantage.

Figure 1.1: Indicators of activity and geopolitical risks in the global economy

Source: Bloomberg. Geopolitical Risk (GPR) Index. Latest data: left: February 2026, right: March 2026.

Economic growth in the euro area, which at the end of last year was being driven by domestic demand, has continued at the beginning of this year, supported by services and a renewed strengthening of manufacturing.

The euro area economy grew by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter in the final quarter of 2025 (Figure 1.2, left). Growth was mainly driven by domestic demand: household consumption contributed 0.2 percentage points, government consumption 0.1 percentage points, and gross fixed capital formation a further 0.1 percentage points. The contribution of net exports was negative (in the amount of 0.1 percentage points). By sector, most of the growth originated in services. Among the larger euro area members, GDP increased the most in Spain (0.8%), followed by the Netherlands (0.5%), Germany and Italy (0.3%), and the least in France (0.2%).

Survey data indicates that growth has continued at the beginning of this year. The composite PMI rose to 51.9 index points in February (Figure 1.2, right), with growth still primarily driven by services. Conditions also improved in manufacturing, where the indicator rose above the growth threshold for the first time in six months. The improvement is further confirmed by the European Commission’s Economic Sentiment Indicator, which in the early part of this year reached its highest level since the first quarter of 2023.

Risks to the further strengthening of activity and to price stability have increased with the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East. Uncertainty is being further heightened by US trade policy, which has led the EU to temporarily postpone ratification of the trade agreement with the US. Trade-related uncertainty could further weaken export orders, with the negative effects of past changes in trade policies still present.

Figure 1.2: Indicators of economic developments in the euro area

Sources: Eurostat, Bloomberg, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: left: Q4 2025, right: February 2026.

In February headline inflation in the euro area remained below the 2% target, while risks turned to the upside amid the escalation of tensions in the Middle East.

Headline inflation in the euro area as measured by the HICP increased to 1.9 % in February, up 0.2 percentage points on the previous month (Figure 1.3, left). The increase was driven by energy and core inflation, while food price inflation remained unchanged. Energy prices were 3.2% lower in year-on-year terms (4.0% in January), reflecting a positive base effect and ongoing price increases. As the conflict in the Middle East escalated, price pressures increased due to a surge in global oil and natural gas prices. Risks to year-on-year energy price inflation and headline inflation have turned to the upside.

Year-on-year food price inflation remained at 2.6% amid a continued divergence between unprocessed and processed food prices. Unprocessed food inflation accelerated to 4.6%, partly in reflection of current price rises and adverse weather conditions at the beginning of the year. By contrast, processed food inflation declined to 1.8%, falling for the seventh consecutive month, in reflection of the easing of food commodity prices on global markets.

Core inflation excluding energy and food increased by 0.2 percentage points to 2.4% in February. The increase was mainly driven by services prices, which were 3.4% higher in year-on-year terms (3.2% in January). ECB indicators point to a gradual normalisation of wage pressures this year; alongside more moderate domestic price pressures, this could contribute to a gradual easing of service price inflation. Year-on-year growth in prices of non-energy industrial goods (hereinafter: other goods) strengthened to 0.7% (up from 0.4% in January), but remains low. This is consistent with weak import price pressures, reflecting the appreciation of the euro and imports of cheaper goods from China.

In February the gap between headline inflation in Slovenia and the euro area widened to 0.9 percentage points, reflecting a larger contribution of energy prices in Slovenia (Figure 1.3, right). Core inflation rates were almost aligned: Slovenia’s rate was 0.1 percentage points lower. The range of headline inflation among euro area member states decreased to 3.0 percentage points, the lowest since the start of the pandemic. Slovakia registered the highest headline inflation rate for the third consecutive month (4.0%), while Cyprus again recorded the lowest (0.9%).

Figure 1.3: Euro area inflation and its difference to inflation in Slovenia

Sources: SURS, Eurostat, ECB, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: February 2026.

Box 1.1: IMF recommendations to Slovenia on productivity and the EU’s plans to deepen financial markets

The International Monetary Fund highlights increased investment in intangible assets as one of the key recommendations for boosting labour productivity growth in Slovenia.

After conclusion of its regular consultations with an individual member country under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement,[5] the International Monetary Fund publishes a report in which it assesses the country’s recent economic developments, and the functioning of its financial sector and banking system, and highlights key challenges for the future. In the latest Report for Slovenia, published on 26 January 2026, special attention was given to the role of intangible investments in promoting labour productivity growth.[6]

The IMF emphasises that labour productivity growth in Slovenia has lagged behind the EU average since 2000. One of the main reasons cited is the lack of investment in intangible assets. In Slovenia intangible investments contributed approximately 20% to labour productivity growth between 2001 and 2021, while tangible investments contributed about 21%. The gap in intangible asset investment compared to EU innovation leaders increased to around 4.5% of GDP by 2024. This reflects lower investments in software, databases, R&D, and organisational capital.[7] To reduce this gap and increase investments of this kind, it is necessary to improve access to appropriate financial resources, reduce barriers to investment, and strengthen the innovation and entrepreneurial environment as well as investments in human capital.

The IMF finds that the main challenges in this area for Slovenia are the small size of the venture capital market and the fragmentation of the entrepreneurial and innovation environment. According to the IMF, investments in intangible assets are often financed by venture capital, which is limited in the Slovenian financial system, which relies predominantly on bank financing. Despite the efforts of Slovene promotional development and export bank (SID banka) and the Slovenian Enterprise Fund, which offer new products in this area, companies often have to rely on internal financing. The IMF also notes that bank lending may be unsuitable or too expensive for financing small and medium-sized enterprises, and given the high share of bank debt in the capital structure of Slovenian companies, this poses an additional obstacle.

In addition to the national measures already adopted to promote innovation and intangible investments,[8] initiatives at the EU level to deepen European capital markets are also important.

The IMF recommends actively supporting these initiatives, as they will help Slovenia broaden access to the financial resources needed to finance innovation and thereby accelerate productivity growth.

According to the IMF, completing the Savings and Investments Union (SIU)[9] will play an important role, as a larger pool of capital could offer young and innovative companies broader financing options and exit strategies.[10] The purpose of this European Commission (EC) initiative is to deepen the EU financial system by improving citizens’ access to capital markets and expanding financing opportunities for businesses. This would increase the wealth of residents, strengthen economic growth, and enhance the competitiveness of the EU.

As part of the SIU project, the European Commission has recently proposed a new package of measures for further integration of EU financial markets. These measures are aimed at removing existing barriers and making better use of the EU single market’s potential. Special emphasis is placed on creating synergies in trading, settlement, asset management, and innovation, which would enable market participants to operate as smoothly as possible across all member states. To this end, the European Commission proposes measures to: a) improve the possibilities for obtaining a passport for regulated trading markets and central securities depositories (CSDs), b) introduce the status of “Pan-European Market Operator” for operators of trading venues, c) streamline the cross-border distribution of investment funds within the EU, and d) remove regulatory barriers to innovation related to distributed ledger technology.

An important element of the Commission’s proposal is the establishment of an integrated EU supervisory framework for capital markets, which, according to the Commission could bring significant benefits such as reducing costs, eliminating duplication of financial market infrastructures, and increasing trust in the market. The Commission also proposes transferring direct supervisory powers over significant and cross-border market infrastructures[11] to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In addition, the Commission is preparing measures to address differences in national tax and insolvency procedures, thereby encouraging further (cross-border) investment within the EU. To increase retail investor participation in capital markets, the Commission’s initiatives also address areas that Slovenia is already actively developing, such as financial literacy and the establishment of savings and investment accounts, both of which are also supported by the IMF.

In addition to access to finance, the IMF also emphasises the need to improve the business environment and reduce administrative barriers that slow down procedures and increase operating costs for companies. Closer cooperation between the needs of the economy (businesses) and academia is also essential, as this is necessary for effectively addressing challenges related to mismatches between labour market supply and demand.[12] The productivity gap with leading EU innovation countries could be reduced by fostering links between multinationals and small and medium-sized enterprises. According to the IMF, institutionalising cooperation within the innovation ecosystem could unlock knowledge potential, boost innovation, and enable Slovenia to move closer to the level of the EU’s innovation leaders.

2Monetary Policy and Financial Markets

The Eurosystem maintained the interest rate on the deposit facility at 2.00% in February, while the Fed kept its key interest rate within the corridor of 3.50% to 3.75% at its January meeting.

The Governing Council of the ECB assesses that inflation will stabilise at the 2% target over the medium term, while the economy remains resilient despite a challenging global environment. With inflation moderating and inflation expectations remaining stable, the Eurosystem kept all three key interest rates unchanged at its February meeting. Accordingly the interest rates on the deposit facility, main refinancing operations, and the marginal lending facility remain at 2.00%, 2.15%, and 2.40% respectively.

At its January meeting the Fed left its key interest rate within the corridor of 3.50% to 3.75%. This decision primarily reflected more encouraging data from the US labour market.[13] Key interest rates also remained unchanged in the United Kingdom (3.75%), Canada (2.25%), Sweden (1.75%), and Japan (0.75%). In contrast, the central bank of Australia raised its key interest rate by 0.25 percentage points to 3.85%, due to persistently elevated inflationary pressures.

Following the outbreak of war in the Middle East, market participants’ expectations of higher inflation strengthened due to disruptions in energy supplies. Since the beginning of February their expectations regarding further reductions in the Fed’s key interest rate have consequently diminished, while investors no longer rule out the possibility of a 0.25 percentage point increase in the ECB’s key interest rates this year. Current overnight index swap (OIS) rates indicate that markets expect one to two further reductions of 0.25 percentage points in the Fed’s key interest rate by the end of 2026, which would lower the corridor to 3.00% to 3.25% (see Figure 2.1, left).

Figure 2.1: Interest rate swap rate curves and government bond yields

Sources: Bloomberg, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: 6 March 2026.

Major global equity indices have mostly declined since the beginning of February, while both the US dollar and the price of oil have risen following the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East.

US treasury yields declined in February, primarily in response to the release of the January inflation data, which came in below expectations. Similarly German government bond yields also decreased, tracking the movements in US yields. At the beginning of March yields on both markets increased amid concerns that the war in the Middle East would result in a more persistent rise in inflation. Consequently yields on German short-term government bonds have risen by 0.11 percentage points since the beginning of February, while yields at longer maturities have remained unchanged. Yields on US short-term treasuries are also close to their levels at the beginning of February, whereas yields at longer maturities have decreased by 0.13 percentage points over the entire period (see Figure 2.1, right). Spreads between yields on euro-denominated bonds with higher credit risk and German government bonds have widened slightly during the observation period, as investors moved towards safer assets.

Since the beginning of February major global equity indices have exhibited divergent trends (see Figure 2.2, left), with developments in the Middle East exerting a significant influence. In the United States equity indices declined in February, driven by increased investor concerns over the elevated valuations of US tech firms and the profitability of investments in AI. In early March a reduced appetite for riskier assets further contributed to this downward movement. During this period the S&P 500 fell by 2.1%, while the index comprising the seven largest US tech firms (the Magnificent Seven) declined by 6.1%. The main European index, the STOXX Europe 600, reached an all-time high at the end of February, supported by robust economic data and earnings by European firms, but subsequently fell by 4.3% in early March. The tech-focused Hang Seng index in Hong Kong has lost 3.8% of its value since the start of February.

The US dollar has appreciated by 1.6% against the euro and by 1.4% against a basket of major global currencies since the beginning of February (see Figure 2.2, right), mainly as a result of investors shifting towards safer currencies amid heightened geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. The price of gold has increased by 9.4% since the beginning of February, but remains 8.8% below its record high from the end of January (USD 5,595 per ounce). The recent rise in gold prices has been driven by increased demand following a pronounced decline at the end of January and by escalating tensions in the Middle East, although the rising US dollar has partly limited further gains. The price of Brent crude has risen by 29.6% since the beginning of February, mainly due to disruptions in energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.

Figure 2.2: Developments in equity indices, the euro and the US dollar

Sources: Bloomberg, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: 6 March 2026.

Note: In the left chart the Magnificent Seven comprise Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla. In the right chart DXY measures the US dollar against a basket of six currencies (EUR, JPY, GBP, CAD, SEK, CHF) based on trade weights, with the euro having the largest weight at 57%. NEER41 denotes the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro against 41 trading partners. The EUR/USD exchange rate indicates the movement of the euro against the US dollar, where a higher value denotes a stronger euro and vice versa.

3Domestic Economic Activity

Growth in domestic market activity strengthened in the final quarter of last year, while foreign demand remained subdued.

At the end of last year quarterly GDP growth stood at 0.4%, only slightly above the euro area average, while year-on-year growth reached 2.0%. Government action was a major driver of the rise in domestic demand, with the government intensifying construction investment last year. This again accounted for the bulk of the overall year-on-year growth in gross fixed capital formation, which reached 12.0%. Final consumption also strengthened notably: the increase in private consumption coincided with the introduction of the mandatory Christmas bonus and the payment of the winter allowance for pensioners, while the rise in government consumption reflected the initial implementation of long-term social care. Given this structure of economic growth, imports were significantly stronger than exports. The negative contribution of net trade widened to 3.1 percentage points and, amid challenging conditions in foreign markets, was the only drag on GDP growth from the expenditure perspective (Figure 3.1, left).

The breakdown of demand was also reflected in developments in value-added. Construction stood out markedly, with value-added rising by 16.5% year-on-year, supported by strong momentum in government-driven infrastructure projects. This contributed 1.0 percentage points to GDP growth (Figure 3.1, right). According to monthly statistics, activity strengthened across all segments of construction. Growth in value-added in private services also remained favourable, again exceeding 2.0%. Overall services growth was held back mainly by weak activity in the segment of transportation and storage linked to international goods trade. Solid growth in value-added in public services continued as employment increased further. By contrast, the challenging conditions in the international environment continued to be reflected in manufacturing, where value-added declined by 2.6%. Of the major industries, the sole year-on-year increase in activity was recorded by food production, while it fell more noticeably in the manufacture of fabricated metal products, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, and other machinery and equipment. According to a rough estimate, it also declined in the pharmaceutical industry. Weak output is gradually spilling over into the labour market (see Section 4).

Figure 3.1: GDP growth

Source: SURS. Latest data: Q4 2025.

After a stable January, the economic sentiment deteriorated in February, and according to some indicators domestic demand slowed at the beginning of the year.

The economic sentiment indicator remained unchanged in January compared with December, but in February it declined to its lowest level in 12 months. Confidence weakened across all sectors, and slightly among consumers. The more pronounced decline in manufacturing was mainly the result of lower production expectations and an increase in inventories. Assessments of current orders also fell somewhat, and firms continue to report elevated uncertainty regarding economic conditions; the survey was conducted before the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East (Figure 3.2, left). In construction, survey indicators point to a moderation of activity, with orders decreasing in February for the first time since June of last year. Current and year-on-year declines in assessments of demand in February also contributed to the decline in confidence in private services excluding retail, although it remained at a relatively high level.[14] A similar pattern is observed among consumers, who continue to assess their financial situation relatively favourably, while maintaining elevated inflation expectations.

According to the initial real activity indicators, domestic consumption slowed at the beginning of the year. Real year-on-year growth in the value of card payments and cash withdrawals at ATMs slowed to 2.1% in January and February combined, while the value of fiscally verified invoices actually declined by 2.0% (Figure 3.2, right). Weaker spending is also suggested by January’s fall in turnover in retail trade and trade in motor vehicles.

Figure 3.2: Uncertainty in manufacturing and early indicators of domestic market consumption

Sources: SURS, Bankart, FURS, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data left: Q1 2026, right: February 2026.

Note: The left chart shows the share of manufacturing firms that cited uncertain economic conditions among the key factors currently limiting production. In the right chart the HICP deflator is used to calculate real growth. The two points represent the aggregate year-on-year change in January and February.

Box 3.1: Nowcasts for GDP growth in the first quarter

The average of the nowcasting models for the first quarter points to 0.5% quarterly GDP growth, which is slightly below the long-term average.

The current average nowcast of quarterly GDP growth for the first quarter stands at 0.5% (Figure 3.1.1, left). The nowcast is supported by the January improvement in economic sentiment by 0.1 percentage points – primarily reflecting higher confidence in manufacturing and among consumers – and by solid GDP growth at the end of last year. Conversely, the growth estimate is lowered by the February deterioration in economic sentiment, which declined by 3.0 percentage points as all five confidence indicators fell, and by a 1.9% monthly decline in retail trade turnover, which was broadly based.

A more pronounced adjustment to the estimate of quarterly GDP growth is expected in the second half of March, when January data for key monthly indicators of economic activity, including industrial production, construction, and services and trade activities, will be released.

The limited dataset of high-frequency indicators is also reflected in the chart showing the distribution of nowcasts (Figure 3.1.1, right). The range based on the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution currently lies between 0.2% and 0.7%.

Figure 3.1.1: Nowcast for economic growth

Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Notes: The left-hand chart displays the nowcasts for quarterly GDP growth. The gold area represents the interval between the 25th and 75th percentiles, while the green area represents the interval between the lowest and highest nowcasts. The line indicates the average nowcast of quarterly GDP growth for the first quarter of 2026. The right-hand chart illustrates the distribution of the nowcasts for quarterly GDP growth in the first quarter of 2026. The vertical gold line represents the median, and the red line the mean. The relative frequency represents the share of the total set of models yielding a particular growth nowcast. Nowcast date: 4 March 2026.

Box 3.2: Corporate investment in Slovenia in an international comparison

Slovenian firms invest significantly less than firms in comparable euro area countries, with access to financing not being the main limiting factor.

Gross fixed capital formation of non-financial corporations (hereinafter corporate investment) represents an important driver of economic activity, and makes a key contribution to the growth of economic potential. In Slovenia corporate investment accounted for slightly more than half of total gross investment in 2024 (54.2%), and was equivalent to 11.3% of GDP.[15] The investment activity of Slovenian firms thus lagged significantly behind that of comparable euro area countries in central and eastern Europe (CEE).[16] Corporate investment was equivalent to 13.0% of GDP in these countries (see Figure 3.2.1). A slight lag is also evident in comparison with the euro area average (11.6% of GDP), which is particularly problematic from the perspective of economic convergence, as the accumulation of fixed assets and capital – alongside productivity growth and the (already virtually exhausted) growth in the labour force – constitutes a fundamental source for increasing the potential output of the Slovenian economy.[17] The lag in investment activity relative to CEE countries and the euro area is even more pronounced when comparing corporate investment to the value-added generated by firms. In Slovenia corporate investment amounts to 21.4% of value-added, while the CEE average is 3.5 percentage points higher.

The majority of investment by Slovenian firms is allocated to the replacement of depreciated assets.

From the perspective of analysing potential economic growth, it is meaningful to monitor not only developments in gross investment but also net investment, which excludes the consumption of fixed capital, i.e. the replacement of depreciated fixed assets. Net investment determines the pace at which the capital stock in the economy increases, and thus the country’s economic potential. Slovenia’s investment lag behind CEE countries is even more pronounced under this view. Net corporate investment in Slovenia amounts to only 1.8% of value-added, compared with 7.6% in CEE countries. This suggests that the build-up of corporate fixed capital in CEE countries is proceeding at a rate approximately four times faster than in the domestic economy. Similarly to gross investment, Slovenian firms also slightly lag behind the euro area in terms of net investment, where the share stands at 2.1% of value-added.

An additional perspective on the lag in investment activity at Slovenian firms is provided by the ratio of net corporate investment to net profit after tax, which measures the share of actual net profit that firms allocate to the growth of fixed capital. In this respect Slovenian firms (16.0%) still lag behind CEE countries (32.6%), but in contrast to previous indicators they rank significantly above the euro area average (8.7%). This indicates that Slovenian firms invest a higher share of their net profit after tax compared with firms in the euro area overall, and that relatively weak profitability could be a limiting factor on investment. According to national accounts data, net return on equity after tax in Slovenia is more than half lower than in CEE countries and in the euro area overall. One of the factors contributing to this is relatively high labour costs, which is reflected in their above-average ratio to value-added at Slovenian firms (see Figure 3.2.1).

Figure 3.2.1: Indicators of corporate investment and performance in Slovenia, the euro area, and CEE countries

Sources: Eurostat, ECB, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: Investment refers to gross fixed capital formation of non-financial corporations (sector S.11). Value-added (VA) refers to the VA of non-financial corporations. The euro area (EA) includes member states excluding Bulgaria, which was not a member of the euro area in the reference year. CEE refers to the group of central and eastern European countries that are members of the euro area (Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia). The figures for CEE countries are GDP-weighted averages. All figures refer to 2024.

One potential constraint on investment by Slovenian firms could be limited access to bank financing; however, a review of the indicators and analysis in Boxes 3.4 and 3.5, as well as in Selected Theme 8.1, does not confirm this. Slovenian firms are less indebted than firms in CEE countries and the euro area overall, while the cost of bank borrowing is comparable to that in the euro area and lower than in CEE countries (see Figure 3.2.2). According to EIB survey data, the share of financially constrained firms in Slovenia (9.0%) is somewhat higher than in CEE countries (7.2%) and the euro area overall (5.7%), but it remains very low and does not explain the difference in investment activity.[18] According to the same survey, only 17.0% of firms assess their level of investment as too low, which is comparable to CEE countries (17.1%). This suggests that the realised investment activity of Slovenian firms largely reflects their investment preferences and the economic fundamentals of the environment in which they operate.

The lower propensity of Slovenian firms to invest could at least partly be explained by their structural characteristics, such as the average size of firms[19] and their integration into global value chains.[20] However Slovenian firms do not differ significantly from firms in CEE countries from this perspective. The ratio value-added to domestic final demand in Slovenia in 2022 was comparable to that in CEE countries, and considerably above the euro area average.[21] Slovenian firms are, on average, smaller than those in the euro area overall, but comparable to firms in CEE countries.

Slovenian firms identify shortages of skilled labour and uncertainty in the business environment as the most significant barriers to investment.

In the EIB survey Slovenian firms cite shortages of skilled labour, uncertainty, and energy costs as the main constraints on investment arising from the broader business environment, and these are also the principal constraints in CEE countries.[22] By contrast the least constraining factors are the availability of digital infrastructure and access to finance, which are identified as problematic by a significantly smaller share of firms in Slovenia than in CEE countries and the euro area.[23] Similar conclusions are drawn by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) World Competitiveness Survey, which also highlights the shortage of skilled labour as a significant limiting factor, despite relatively high expenditure on education and training. Among the reasons cited are brain drain, weaker practical training, and the lower attractiveness of Slovenia for highly skilled foreign professionals, who, compared with the euro area average and CEE countries, have less incentive to work and progress due to higher taxation of labour.[24] Another significant limiting factor is the less predictable business environment. In addition, the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking indicates that in terms of investment Slovenia lags behind particularly with regard to investment in intellectual property, insufficient investment incentives for firms, and the amount of foreign direct investment.

Figure 3.2.2: Indicators of the investment environment in Slovenia, the euro area, and CEE countries

Sources: EIB (Investment Survey 2025), IMF, OECD (TiVA), Eurostat, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: The cost of borrowing represents the average for 2024. The shares of financially constrained firms and firms with insufficient investment are based on the EIB survey; for the euro area (EA) and CEE, these are calculated as GDP-weighted averages. The ratio of foreign value-added to domestic final demand refers to 2022, and illustrates the foreign value-added contained in final goods and services purchased by end consumers. The IMD ranking for international investment indicates the position that a country or group of countries occupied in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking in 2025 (international investment component), with the rankings for the euro area and CEE calculated as GDP-weighted averages. Due to data unavailability, Malta is not included in the calculation for the euro area. The euro area covers the euro area countries other than Bulgaria, which was not a member during the observation period. CEE refers to the group of central and eastern European countries that are members of the euro area (Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia).

Box 3.3: Loan supply shocks and their impact on private consumption in Slovenia

Understanding the effects of loan supply shocks on private consumption constitutes an important aspect of monitoring cyclical economic developments.

In Slovenia private consumption accounts for approximately 52% of real GDP, thereby remaining one of the key components of domestic demand and cyclical developments. Although household indebtedness remains relatively low compared to the euro area overall – around 28% of GDP versus 59% in the euro area – household loans represent an important aspect of the broader macrofinancial environment. In 2025 household loans, particularly housing and consumer loans, were the main driver of overall growth in bank lending.[25] While year-on-year growth in housing loans stood at 8.8% in December 2025, consumer loans recorded a growth rate of 9.8%. This figure was down slightly from its peaking of 16.7% in June 2024.[26] This analysis examines the effects of negative shocks in the supply of consumer loans on private consumption in Slovenia, and their transmission to individual consumption categories, i.e. durable goods, non-durable goods, and services. This breakdown enables a more accurate assessment of the effects of the loan supply channel on the Slovenian economy, particularly given the key role of household loans in the overall financing structure.

To assess the impact of loan supply on private consumption, we follow the approach of Cavallo et al. (2024) and use data from the Bank Lending Survey (BLS).[27] As a measure of changes in credit standards and loan terms and conditions (hereinafter: lending conditions) for consumer loans to households, the analysis uses the difference between the percentage of banks reporting a deterioration in credit standards and conditions over the last three months and the percentage reporting an improvement.[28] Since changes in lending conditions may also reflect factors affecting loan demand and the broader macroeconomic environment, we adjust the BLS data for the influence of the overall macroeconomic conditions and perceived changes in loan demand.[29] The unexplained residual from the second step represents exogenous unexpected changes in the supply of bank loans, i.e. the bank loan supply indicator (BLSI).[30] The indicator is standardised, with higher values indicating a tightening of loan supply, and vice-versa.

The effects of loan supply shocks, as captured by the BLSI, are estimated using a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model. For each indicator of private consumption (aggregate private consumption, durable goods, non-durable goods, services), we estimate a separate BVAR model for the period from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2019.[31] In addition to the BLSI and year-on-year growth in the selected private consumption indicator, the model specifications include core inflation, year-on-year growth in consumer loans, the ECB shadow rate[32] (Krippner, 2013), and year-on-year growth in foreign demand for Slovenia. The shadow rate and foreign demand are treated as exogenous variables, which allows for better identification of domestic shocks (Cushman & Zha, 1997; Zha, 1999). Loan supply shocks, similarly to Bassett et al. (2014), are identified using a recursive Cholesky decomposition, with the BLSI ordered first among the domestic variables, followed by consumption growth, core inflation, and loan growth. This econometric approach reflects the assumption that the BLSI, adjusted for contemporaneous demand and overall macroeconomic factors, does not respond simultaneously to other variables in the system, while loan supply shocks can have a direct, within-quarter impact on consumption, inflation, and loan growth.[33]

Figure 3.3.1: Impulse response of private consumption and its components to a bank loan supply shock

Sources: SURS, ECB, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: The lines in the left chart show the median response of private consumption growth and its components to a one-standard-deviation loan supply shock. The diamonds mark the point estimates of impulse responses whose 16th to 84th percentile posterior intervals exclude zero. In the right chart the contributions are computed as the product of the impulse responses of the individual components and their average nominal shares in total private consumption over the period of 2007 to 2019. These shares amount to 9% for durable goods, 48% for non-durable goods, and 43% for services. * The aggregated response of private consumption is calculated as the weighted sum of the contributions of the individual components, and may therefore differ from the response obtained from a separate model specification that includes total private consumption directly.

A loan supply shock has a significant impact on consumption, with the effect being transmitted primarily through the consumption of durable goods.

A negative loan supply shock leads to a decline in private consumption growth, reaching its peak negative effect after approximately three to four quarters at around -0.2 percentage points (Figure 3.3.1, left). The effect gradually dissipates after about two years, which is consistent with theoretical predictions and empirical findings (e.g. Cavallo et al., 2024). At the same time, the aggregate results mask substantial heterogeneity across individual consumption components (Figure 3.3.1, left). Consumption of durable goods responds strongly and persistently, with the largest decline – around 1.1 percentage points – occurring after two quarters. Although the effect gradually fades thereafter, the response remains significantly more pronounced than that of total consumption. Despite accounting for a relatively small share of total consumption (around 9% over the period 2007–2019), durable goods contribute the most to the overall response of private consumption (Figure 3.3.1, right). In contrast, consumption of non-durable goods and services – which account for 48% and 43% of private consumption respectively – tracks current income more closely, exhibiting more muted responses. This pattern suggests that when lending conditions tighten, households tend to maintain essential consumption, while adjustments are concentrated in expenditure categories that can be postponed and that depend more heavily on external financing, such as purchases of vehicles, household appliances, and furniture.[34]

The results highlight the importance of disaggregating private consumption when assessing the effects of loan supply shocks. Analyses based solely on aggregate consumption may underestimate both the speed and magnitude of the impact of tighter lending conditions, as the strongest effects initially occur in durable goods. Although this component represents a relatively small share of total consumption, it is highly sensitive to lending conditions and may therefore serve as an early indicator of a broader economic slowdown.

Box 3.4: Firms’ access to financing and its impact on investment

Empirical analysis shows that constraints on access to financing are not a key factor behind the persistently weak investment activity in Slovenia since the global financial crisis.

In discussions on weak investment dynamics following the global financial crisis, the question has often arisen as to whether constraints on access to external financing, particularly bank loans, constituted a significant obstacle to firms’ investment activity. The analysis therefore examines the impact of access to bank financing on firms’ investment in Slovenia in the post-crisis period.

The analysis distinguishes between changes in firms’ demand for loans and the supply of bank credit. To this end, we employ the Khwaja-Mian[35] methodological approach, which, based on credit register data and bank-firm linkages for the period of 2002 to 2025, enables the identification of changes in loan supply originating from the banking system, independently of the business decisions of individual firms. The baseline identification is based on a methodological decomposition of the growth in loans to firm i at bank b, L_ibt, into firm-time fixed effects, α_it, and bank-time fixed effects, ß_bt, using panel regression techniques and the following equation:

In this context, the firm-time fixed effects, α_it, are interpreted as firms’ demand for loans, while the bank-time fixed effects, ß_bt, are interpreted as shocks to loan supply.[36] On the basis of the estimated bank shocks and firms’ prior exposure to individual banks, we construct an estimated indicator of loan supply at firm level:

where w_ib denotes the share of loans of firm i at bank b in period t-1. This indicator of loan supply captures changes in credit conditions faced by a firm as a result of developments in the banking system, and is independent of the firm’s contemporaneous investment decisions.

In the next step we use this indicator as an explanatory variable in the investment equation to analyse the relationship between changes in loan supply and firms’ investment activity. The investment equation is based on firms’ accounting data from the AJPES database and is estimated at an annual frequency:

where I_it denotes firms’ investment rate, as measured by growth rate of tangible fixed assets; Supply_it the estimated indicator of loan supply; X_it a vector of control variables;[37] μ_i firm fixed effects; and τ_t time effects. This specification allows us to assess whether, and to what extent, access to bank loans affects firms’ investment and whether these effects are more pronounced for firms that are more financially constrained by their characteristics, such as smaller firms and firms with less available collateral.

The results indicate that loan supply has a statistically significant positive effect on firms’ investment activity (Figure 3.4.1, left). For the overall estimation sample, a 1 percentage point increase in loan supply increases the investment rate by 0.24 percentage points.[38] The effect is more pronounced for smaller firms and for firms with less available collateral, which are typically more reliant on bank financing and face more limited access to alternative sources of funding. Loan supply thus acts as a channel through which a deterioration in banking sector conditions may further dampen investment activity, while an improvement may stimulate it, particularly among financially constrained firms.

Figure 3.4.1: The impact of loan supply on investment and the dynamics of loan supply and the investment rate

Sources: Banka Slovenije, AJPES, Banke Slovenije estimates. Last observation: 2024.

Note: The left chart shows the estimated effect of bank loan supply on firms’ investment activity, with results presented for the full sample and separately by firm size and the availability of collateral. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** p-value < 0.01. The right chart shows the time profile of the estimated loan supply and the investment rate, with both variables indexed to 2002. The investment rate is measured by growth in firms’ property, plant and equipment.

Developments in the estimated loan supply and the investment rate do not support the hypothesis that constraints on access to bank loans explain the persistently weak investment activity following the global financial crisis. As illustrated in Figure 3.4.1 (right), the two variables exhibited a relatively high level of correlation until 2017: prior to the global financial crisis both were at higher levels, while after the sharp contraction in investment in 2009 loan supply also declined until 2013, when a comprehensive recapitalisation of the Slovenian banking system was carried out and non-performing claims were transferred to the Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC). This allowed loan supply to gradually recover in the subsequent years, additionally supported by stronger bank capitalisation and excess liquidity stemming from the expansionary monetary policy in the euro area. The investment rate did not follow this trend, suggesting that constraints on the supply of financing have not been the main factor behind weak investment activity over the past decade.

Box 3.5: The role of credit market factors in the investment activity of Slovenian firms

Following the pandemic, the investment activity of Slovenian firms was mostly affected by liquidity demand shocks, driven by an uncertain macroeconomic and business environment. Amid turbulence in energy markets and a sharp increase in firms’ operating costs, credit risk shocks also temporarily constrained investment.

Recent analysis by Banka Slovenije[39] and the existing international literature (e.g. Cette et al., 2016) find that a supportive investment environment is crucial for future productivity growth. Business investment is recognised as a key driver of capital deepening, the adoption of new technologies, and the optimisation of business processes. An equally important role is played by the feedback loop generated by higher productivity, as it improves expected returns, strengthens profitability, and encourages firms to expand their production capacity (e.g. Andrews et al., 2016).

In this box we focus on the impact of supply and demand factors in the bank lending market on past developments in investment. For this purpose growth in corporate investment is decomposed into four shocks:

  • An investment demand shock reflects changes in incentives for productive investment stemming from fundamental real factors, such as expected corporate profitability, business confidence, capacity utilisation and technology.

  • A liquidity demand shock is interpreted as changes in firms’ propensity to hold liquid assets as a precautionary buffer rather than invest in capital.

  • A bank profit function shock refers to changes in the conditions affecting banks’ profitability (e.g. funding costs, interest margins, regulatory conditions and risk appetite), which influence their willingness to lend.

  • A credit risk shock captures changes in the perception of risks associated with lending (e.g. a deterioration in firms’ creditworthiness or a higher probability of default).

The identification of shocks and the estimation of their impact on business investment are based on an empirical Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model, following the approach of Zabavnik and Verbič (2024). The model includes real business investment, real loans to non-financial corporations (firms), the composite interest rate on loans to firms,[40] and the country-level indicator of financial stress (CLIFS) as endogenous variables.[41] Foreign demand and the ECB shadow interest rate are included as exogenous time series reflecting the global business cycle and the monetary policy stance of the ECB. This set of variables is available for the period from the first quarter of 1999 to the third quarter of 2025. Using a sign restriction identification scheme (Rubio-Ramírez et al., 2010; Arias et al., 2018), we examine the importance of the four structural shocks with regard to developments in business investment, capturing the dynamics on the supply and demand sides of the loan market.[42]

Using the model described, developments in investment growth can be decomposed into the effects of the identified supply and demand shocks in the market for bank lending to firms (Figure 3.5.1). Following the pandemic, liquidity demand shocks represented the most pronounced constraint on firms’ investment activity. Amid the markedly heightened uncertainty in the business environment during the pandemic, after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, and more recently in the context of worsening trade policies, firms’ preference for the precautionary build-up of liquidity buffers and the postponement of investment expenditure increased. Increased uncertainty regarding future revenues, energy price developments, and the availability of raw materials prompted firms to adjust their investment plans, with maintaining financial resilience often taking precedence over expanding production capacity.

Credit risk shocks were also a temporary constraining factor in 2022. The strong negative impact of these shocks in that year reflects the significantly more difficult business conditions for firms, particularly in energy-intensive industries, which was the result of turbulence in energy markets, sharply increased uncertainty in the external environment, and the rapid rise in prices and constrained supply of intermediate goods. Alongside persistent structural challenges, these factors also affected economic activity in Slovenia’s most important trading partners. This was reflected in 2023 and 2024 in the increased negative impact of foreign demand on the dynamics of firms’ investment. The uncertain external environment and the deterioration in trade policies also weighed on investment in 2025, primarily through investment demand shocks and the precautionary build-up of liquidity buffers.

The empirical results therefore indicate that, apart from 2022, firms’ investment activity in the post-pandemic period was predominantly constrained by demand-side factors. By contrast, bank lending supply factors, or firms’ access to financing, remained neutral or supportive with regard to firms’ investment activity during most of the period under review. The model-based results thus corroborate the findings presented in Boxes 3.2 and 3.4 and in Selected Theme 8.1.

Figure 3.5.1: Decomposition of year-on-year growth in business investment by credit market factors

Sources: Eurostat, SURS, Banka Slovenije estimates.

Note: * Contributions for 2025 refer to the first three quarters.

Box 3.6: Developments in digital investment and their contribution to GDP growth

The euro area and Slovenia lag significantly behind the United States in terms of the ratio of digital investment to GDP and its contribution to GDP growth.

Over the past decade the use of digital technologies at firms has increased markedly, particularly following the spread of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools; this has stimulated higher investment in hardware and software infrastructure, as well as in research and development. As highlighted in analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, digital investment had previously been recognised as an important driver of economic growth in the United States, and its contribution strengthened further in 2025. By contrast, according to the IMF’s assessment, the positive effects of digital investment in the euro area are expected to remain somewhat more modest.

In this box we analyse the intensity and developments of digital investment in the euro area and Slovenia, and assess its direct contribution to economic growth. Digital investment also includes investments in AI, which in recent years, especially in the United States, has become a key factor in the growth in digital investment.

Figure 3.6.1: Digital investment share in Slovenia, the euro area and the United States

Sources: Eurostat, Fred, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: The digital investment share is the ratio of the total investment (in information and communication technology equipment, software and databases, and research and development) to GDP, both expressed at current prices. The grey shaded areas indicate periods of economic crisis in the euro area, while the green shaded area denotes the period of expansion during the dot-com boom. Expenditure on R&D for the euro area is calculated excluding Ireland, due to the pronounced volatility of the data.

Following the approach of Rubinton and Patra (2026), the analysis focuses on investment expenditure in connection with digital investment across all sectors of the economy. Digital investment comprises investment in information and communication technology equipment, software and databases, as well as research and development,[43] which are included under gross fixed capital formation in the national accounts.[44] Data for the euro area is available on an annual basis up to 2024, while comparable data for the United States is available on a quarterly basis up to the third quarter of 2025.

The ratio of digital investment to GDP in 2024 was considerably lower in the euro area (4.5%) than in the United States (6.8%; Figure 3.6.1). While both economies experienced a pronounced increase during the dot-com boom (1995 to 2000) and a decline following its collapse (2001 and 2002), the subsequent growth of digital investment in the United States was markedly faster than in the euro area, particularly after 2014. The structure of digital investment in the euro area indicates that research and development (R&D) recorded the largest ratio in 2024, at 2.1% of GDP; this was followed by software and databases (1.7%), while the smallest ratio was recorded by information and communication technology equipment (0.7%). In the United States the ratios of all components are higher: research and development amounted to 2.3% of GDP, software and databases to 2.4%, and information and communication technology equipment to 1.2%.

The data indicates that the direct contributions of digital investment to GDP growth in the United States are considerably higher than in the euro area (Figure 3.6.2). In 2024 digital investment contributed around 0.05 percentage points to the euro area’s real GDP growth of 0.9%, which is substantially less than during the dot-com boom, when it contributed around 0.2 percentage points to economic growth of 3.0%. In the United States these contributions were more pronounced: during the dot-com boom, digital investment contributed almost 1 percentage point to GDP growth of 4.8%, while in 2024 it contributed more than 0.2 percentage points to economic growth of 2.8%. The available data for 2025 for the United States indicates a marked increase in the contribution of digital investment, which reached approximately 0.9 percentage points by the third quarter. This points to a strong acceleration in digital investment associated with investment in the development and deployment of AI.

Figure 3.6.2: Contributions of digital investment to GDP growth in Slovenia, the euro area and the United States

Sources: Eurostat, Fred, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: The contributions of digital investment to GDP growth are calculated as the product of the real growth in digital investment and its ratio to GDP. The grey shaded areas indicate periods of economic crisis in the euro area, while the green shaded area denotes the period of expansion during the dot-com boom. The data for the United States for 2025 is based on quarterly data up to the third quarter of 2025; the annual contribution is calculated as the average of three annualised quarterly contributions. Expenditure on R&D for the euro area is calculated excluding Ireland, due to the pronounced volatility of the data.

In Slovenia the ratio of digital investment to GDP amounted to 3.9% in 2024, which is lower than in the euro area overall and the United States, while its developments over the observed period were more volatile. Digital investment relative to GDP reached its highest level during the dot-com boom (4.6%), after which it gradually declined until 2009 (3.6%). After 2014 the ratio increased again slightly, but remained below the levels recorded in the euro area and the United States. The contribution of digital investment to GDP growth in Slovenia is also more volatile. This is partly related to the small size of the economy, where individual large investments can significantly affect overall investment developments and consequently the growth of individual investment categories. During the dot-com boom contributions approached 0.5 percentage points amid economic growth of 5.3%, while the long-term average stands at 0.18 percentage points. This is higher than in the euro area overall (0.14 percentage points), but lower than in the United States (0.45 percentage points). In 2024 the contribution of digital investment increased to approximately 0.26 percentage points amid GDP growth of 1.7%. Although this indicates a strengthening of digital investment activity, the extent to which these developments are associated with investment in AI cannot be reliably assessed on the basis of aggregate data.

Given the historically lower ratio of digital investment to GDP in Slovenia and the euro area, any potential increase in 2025 is likely to be less pronounced than in the United States, implying a more modest contribution to economic growth. A long-term shortfall in digital investment intensity could limit the pace of economic restructuring towards more efficient exploitation of the benefits of AI. Among the factors that could constrain growth in digital investment are relatively high energy and labour costs, regulatory burdens, and uncertainties regarding the future regulatory framework for AI.[45]

4Labour Market

After a year of decline, the number of persons in employment was up in year-on-year terms in December, with the public sector making the key contribution.

Following a year of falling employment, the number of persons in employment increased by 0.3% year-on-year in December (Figure 4.1, left). This was partly driven by retirement dynamics, as according to estimates by the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (ZPIZ) retirement conditions at the end of last year were less favourable than a year earlier, prompting some employees close to retirement to postpone their retirement by several months.[46] Most of the positive year-on-year growth was generated by the public sector. This can attributed partly to the aforementioned retirement effect, as the public sector employs a larger share of older workers,[47] and partly to the need to maintain the provision of public services, particularly in education, social work without accommodation (which is linked to the implementation of long-term social care), and healthcare.

The number of persons in employment was down 0.3% on the previous year on average. The contribution of public sector activities remained positive throughout the year, averaging 0.5 percentage points.[48] By contrast, the contribution of private sector activities amounted to –0.8 percentage points, with the most negative contribution recorded in manufacturing, particularly the manufacture of fabricated metal products, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and machinery and equipment, where the decline in activity was also the most pronounced. Slovenian nationals made a negative contribution to the year-on-year change in the number of persons in employment (in the amount of –0.5 percentage points), while the contribution by foreign nationals remained positive throughout the year (0.3 percentage points), with their share of the persons in employment averaging 16.0% over the year.[49]

Employment expectations remained modest in February according to the survey by the SURS, with the exception of construction. This is also confirmed by the job vacancy survey, according to which demand for labour has been declining over the last three years. The number of vacancies last year was 8.2% lower than a year earlier. The sector with the most notable decline was transportation and storage, while vacancies increased in manufacturing. Together with monthly data showing falling employment in this sector, this points to persistent structural mismatches in the labour market, which is also confirmed by data on shortages of skilled labour that remain above the long-term average (Figure 4.1, right).

Registered unemployment fell at the beginning of the year, but remained above last year’s average.

After four months of year-on-year growth at the end of last year, the number of registered unemployed declined in the first two months of this year. In February there were 48,096 registered unemployed, down 0.4% on a year earlier, but still 5.9% above last year’s average (Figure 4.1, left). In structural terms, the year-on-year fall was mainly driven by persons aged over 50 and those with upper secondary education, while there was a rise in unemployment among persons aged under 25 and those with the lowest and highest levels of education. Outflows from unemployment over the first two months of the year were down on the same period last year, mainly as a result of a decline in hiring. At the same time a fall in redundancies meant that fewer persons were entering unemployment. The registered unemployment rate stood at 4.8% in December of last year, unchanged from a year earlier, and 0.2 percentage points above last year’s average. The surveyed unemployment rate stood at 4.1% in the final quarter of last year, up 0.6 percentage points on a year earlier, and 0.2 percentage points above last year’s average.

Figure 4.1: Persons in employment, unemployed and labour shortages

Sources: SURS, ZRSZ, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: left – registered unemployed: February 2026, persons in employment: December 2025; right: construction and services – February 2026, manufacturing – March 2026.

Note: Labour shortages are measured by the share of firms citing this as a limiting factor on their business. In construction and manufacturing, this refers to shortages of skilled labour.

Wage developments at the end of last year were marked by a year-on-year decline in the average gross wage, and a widening gap between the public and private sectors.

The year-on-year change in the average gross wage turned negative in December of last year for the first time in three and a half years (–0.5%; Figure 4.2, left). The main reason for the decline was smaller extraordinary payments, which firms most likely replaced in part with the mandatory Christmas bonus.[50] Higher inflation meant that the real year-on-year decline in the average gross wage was even more pronounced (–3.0%). Growth in the average gross wage averaged 5.9% over the year, down 0.3 percentage points on the previous year. Real growth stood at 3.3%, down almost 1 percentage point on the previous year.

The gap in the year-on-year changes in the average gross wage between the public and private sectors widened further in December. The average gross wage was down 3.9% in year-on-year terms in the private sector, but up 6.1% in the public sector. Wages in the private sector increased by 3.9% on an annual basis, or 1.4% in real terms. Reform of the public sector pay system meant that wage growth was significantly higher in the public sector at 9.4%, or 6.7% in real terms.

The divergence between the two sectors is also confirmed by the national accounts data.[51] Annual growth in compensation of employees per employee in private sector activities (6.4%) was half that recorded in public sector activities (12.9%). In both sectors growth in compensation per employee exceeded growth in labour productivity, which amounted to 4.3% in private sector activities and 9.7% in public sector activities. Last year’s growth in compensation of employees was dampened by a larger year-on-year decline in the number of employees and by a smaller contribution of compensation per employee in the private sector, but was supported by the contribution of compensation per employee in the public sector (Figure 4.2, right).

Figure 4.2: Average gross wage and breakdown of growth in compensation of employees

Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data: left – December 2025, HICP – February 2026.

Note: In the right chart contributions to growth are calculated using each sector’s weight in compensation of employees from the previous year. Owing to methodological characteristics, the sum may differ slightly from the overall growth rate. The public sector refers to Sectors O, P and Q according to the Standard Classification of Activities 2008 (SKD 2008), while the private sector refers to the remaining sectors. Compensation per employee denotes compensation of employees per employee.

5Current Account

The merchandise trade balance recorded a deficit last year, an outcome observed in the past decade only during the energy crisis in 2022.

Real merchandise exports[52] declined by 0.2% last year, while real imports increased by 2.0%, reducing real GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points. The negative contribution of merchandise trade to GDP growth deepened over the course of the year, mainly due to faster growth in imports in the second half of the year, which tracked the strengthening of domestic demand. The terms of trade, calculated as the ratio of export prices to import prices, strengthened over the course of the year, and improved by 0.9% overall. Export prices rose, while import prices declined, which, in the context of falling real exports, points to a deterioration in the price and cost competitiveness of exporters and a shift in the structure of exports.

According to balance of payments data, nominal merchandise exports increased by 0.4% last year, while nominal merchandise imports were 1.7% higher. The merchandise trade balance showed a deficit of EUR 149 million, a development observed in the past decade only during the energy crisis of 2022.

Global uncertainties had the greatest impact last year on merchandise exports to Switzerland and the United States, while exports of road vehicles to France also declined sharply in the first half of the year. Exports to Germany, Slovenia’s largest trading partner, decreased for the third consecutive year, primarily as a result of falling exports of industrial machinery and road vehicles.[53] In terms of structure, machinery and transport equipment, most notably road vehicles, accounted for the largest share of nominal merchandise exports, followed by chemical products, particularly medical and pharmaceutical products (see Figure 5.1, left). The shares have shifted slightly over the last three years (see Figure 5.1, right): the share accounted for by machinery and transport equipment has decreased somewhat, while the share accounted for by chemical products has increased.

By contrast, the breakdown of nominal imports according to the main product categories remained relatively unchanged over the same period (see Figure 5.1, right). Machinery and transport equipment continued to account for the largest share, followed by chemical products, most notably medical and pharmaceutical products, and industrial materials such as iron, steel, and non-ferrous metals (see Figure 5.1, left). In terms of partner countries, a certain shift away from the largest trading partners has been noted in the past year, as the share of imports from Germany and Italy declined, while imports from some other central European countries, such as Croatia, Austria, and Poland, increased. The share of imports accounted for by China remains broadly unchanged (around 5%), with the main increases seen in imports of electrical machinery and equipment, road vehicles, metal products, and industrial machinery.

The initial data for this year suggests a further contraction in nominal merchandise exports. According to SURS data, exports declined by 3.7%[54] year-on-year in January, and the outlook remains unfavourable, as manufacturing firms did not report any significant increase in export orders in February. At the same time the economic sentiment in key partner countries deteriorated slightly in February, although it remained above last year’s high; these measurements, however, do not yet reflect the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East.[55] Merchandise imports according to SURS data decreased by 5.8% year-on-year in January, in line with the economic sentiment and initial consumption indicators, which point to a slowdown in domestic demand (see Section 3).

Figure 5.1: Structure and changes in merchandise trade

Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: The figure is based on SURS data, except for the category of chemical products, where Banka Slovenije data is partly included.

The current account surplus was attributable solely to the surplus in services trade.

Real exports of services increased by 2.2% last year, while real imports grew by 2.9%. Despite the faster growth in imports, the contribution of services trade to real GDP growth was neutral, owing to the slightly larger volume of exports. The terms of trade in services improved slightly (by 0.2%), particularly in the second half of the year, when export prices increased more markedly than import prices. This partly mitigated the year-on-year decline in the current account surplus (see Figure 5.2, left), which last year was derived exclusively from the surplus in services trade, which reached a record EUR 3.9 billion. Half of this surplus was generated by transport services and travel services, with the surplus in both categories increasing further compared with the previous year (see Figure 5.2, right).

Figure 5.2: Terms of trade and services trade balance

Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data left: Q4 2025, right: December 2025.

Note: In the right chart other business services mostly comprise research and development services and engineering services. Other services include insurance services and goods processing services on behalf of others.

More than half of last year’s services exports consisted of travel services, which increased by 4.6% on the back of a record tourist season, and transport services, which were up 2.6%, although transport exports began to decline towards the end of the year. Daily data for the first 60 days of this year indicates a continued increase in travel services exports, with a year-on-year rise of 8.3% in the number of overnight stays by foreign tourists. The share of total services exports accounted for by insurance services doubled to 5.5% last year, as one of the insurers entered into a major long-term contract. Services exports to Germany declined, while exports to Italy increased, primarily as a result of the aforementioned insurance transaction. Imports of insurance and other business services increased, while imports of transport services fell by 15.1%.

The primary income deficit narrowed by EUR 332.0 million last year to EUR 427.5 million. This was mainly the result of a decline in dividend payments on corporate equity holdings, which coincides with weak value-added growth in sectors with a higher share of foreign-owned firms, and an increase in labour income earned abroad by Slovenian residents, which is associated with higher receipts from Austria. The secondary income deficit increased by EUR 586.9 million, partly in reflection of higher expenditure on various current transfers.

The current account surplus amounted to EUR 2.4 billion last year, or 3.4% of GDP, 1.1 percentage points less than in 2024.

Box 5.1: The current account as a reflection of domestic excess savings

The current account surplus reflects a combination of relatively high private sector saving, and moderate investment activity, and not merely developments in the trade of goods and services.

The current account records flows of goods and services, and primary and secondary income between residents and non-residents. The balance is the difference between receipts from the rest of the world and payments to the rest of the world. The current account balance[56] is also equal to the difference between national saving (S) and investment (I) in the economy:

CA = S – I

A current account deficit indicates that domestic investment exceeds domestic saving, resulting in net borrowing in the rest of the world. Conversely a current account surplus reflects domestic saving exceeding investment, and thus net lending to the rest of the world. Excess domestic saving is channelled abroad through net financial flows, either in the form of direct or portfolio investment, loans, or an increase in other net external claims. Domestic sectors may also deleverage by reducing existing financial liabilities to non-residents.[57]

Over the last decade, with the exception of 2022, Slovenia has recorded a relatively high current account surplus, averaging around 4.7% of GDP. Following the financial crisis, net lending to the rest of the world gradually increased, with households and non-financial corporations (firms) contributing to the surplus, alongside a gradual improvement in the general government balance. In the pandemic year of 2020, households’ net saving increased significantly as a result of limited consumption opportunities, precautionary saving, and extensive government measures to preserve income. That year firms also recorded excess saving, resulting in a record level of net lending (Figure 5.1.1, left). In 2022 the energy shock and rising price pressures following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine temporarily reduced households’ net saving, while firms posted a slight deficit. The current account surplus subsequently increased again, reaching 4.5% of GDP in 2024, accompanied by a rise in the share of saving to GDP and a decline in the share of investment to GDP.

Despite the reduction in the surplus last year, in connection with the slowdown in merchandise exports, it remains relatively high at 3.4% of GDP. In terms of the share of the current account surplus to GDP, Slovenia ranked among the countries with the highest surpluses in the euro area between 2020 and 2024 (Figure 5.1.1, right).

According to IMF estimates, Slovenia’s cyclically adjusted external position in 2025 was estimated at 4.4% of GDP.[58] This is somewhat above the level indicated by fundamentals and desirable policies (2.8% of GDP), and reflects weak investment activity in the economy. The estimate took into account demographic structure, the level of development, the net international investment position, and fiscal policy with a medium-term orientation.

Figure 5.1.1: Net lending (borrowing) or the saving-investment gap

Source: Eurostat.

Note: Firms means non-financial corporations, while households also includes NPISH. In the right figure, the data refer to the average over the period of 2020 to 2024.

Current account deficits and surpluses do not in themselves constitute imbalances, as they may reflect the stage of economic development, demographic trends, or deleveraging processes. However, persistent deviations from levels consistent with fundamentals may indicate imbalances in the structure of domestic demand or investment activity.[59] Measures that foster investment activity and domestic demand, particularly in the areas of human capital, the business environment, and access to finance, can help reduce the deviation of the current account surplus from its estimated equilibrium level.[60]

Sustained current account surpluses and net capital outflows to the rest of the world have significantly improved Slovenia’s net international investment position, placing it among the more financially resilient members of the euro area; however, this has also entailed missed investment opportunities at home.

With several years of current account surpluses and limited investment activity by domestic sectors, Slovenia has shifted from a net debtor to a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the world over the last decade, its position reaching 11.7% of GDP at the end of the third quarter of last year (Figure 5.1.2, left). The shift into positive territory was driven by the behaviour of all institutional sectors. On the one hand households and financial corporations have consistently increased their net financial claims against the rest of the world – households mainly through precautionary saving and restrained consumption, while banks and other financial corporations, during periods of excess liquidity and subdued domestic investment activity, have channelled surplus funds primarily into foreign (debt) securities and the granting of loans, while also making significant loan repayments themselves. On the other hand non-financial corporations and the government have significantly reduced their traditional debtor position; however, this has also meant missed opportunities for financing domestic development and economic restructuring. Analysis across the main instruments reveals that in recent years Slovenia has been strengthening its creditor position across all items; net investments in securities as well as currency and deposits have increased, while the debtor position from direct investment and loans has also eased slightly (Figure 5.1.2, right).

Figure 5.1.2: Breakdown of the net international investment position (NIIP)

Sources: Banka Slovenije, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: NIIP stands for net international investment position. * The data for 2025 is for the end of the third quarter. In the left chart households also include NPISH. In the right chart securities also include financial derivatives (of negligible value).

A more detailed look at the financial transactions and net position of non-financial corporations vis-à-vis the rest of the world shows that they have undergone an intensive process of deleveraging, and are now financially more stable than a decade ago (Figure 5.1.3, left). In recent years, amid heightened economic uncertainty and caution, net capital outflows have been driven primarily by the repayment of foreign loans, the placement of funds in accounts with foreign banks, and net trade credit extended to foreign partners. By contrast, net inflows of foreign direct investment have been steadily increasing, reflecting the limited internationalisation of Slovenian firms while also highlighting the important role of foreign investment as a channel for the transfer of capital and technology.

With the transition to a net creditor position, the Slovenian economy has in recent years ranked among the more financially resilient members of the euro area (Figure 5.1.3, right). This has been supported by sustained current account surpluses and the precautionary financial behaviour of domestic sectors in an environment of subdued investment activity. Both factors have limited economic potential and the process of catching up with more advanced countries; more effective channelling of excess saving into domestic development projects with higher value-added therefore remains essential. This requires improvements in the investment environment, greater corporate profitability, a reduction in uncertainty, and the development of alternative sources of financing that would enable increased investment in advanced technologies and intangible assets. At the same time it remains important to monitor the sectors that generate surpluses and the instruments into which funds are being channelled, as changes in global financial conditions can quickly affect the returns and safety of these investments.

Figure 5.1.3: NIIP of Slovenian firms and other euro area members

Sources: ECB, Banka Slovenije calculations.

Note: NIIP stands for net international investment position. * The data for 2025 is for the end of the third quarter. In the left chart securities include financial derivatives (of negligible value).

6Inflation

Inflation picked up pace in February, primarily due to an effect from last year's measures in connection with electricity prices.

Year-on-year growth in consumer prices as measured by the HICP strengthened to 2.8% in February, up from 2.4% in January. The rise was driven primarily by energy prices, and to a lesser extent by unprocessed food and services prices. By contrast, growth in prices of processed food and other goods dampened inflation in February (Figure 6.1, left). With the geopolitical tensions in the Middle East intensifying, risks to the further slowdown of inflation have also increased. Higher oil and natural gas prices on global markets, reflecting the heightened uncertainty and reduced supply, are expected to pass through to consumers with a lag, and to affect other price groups too.

Energy prices were up 2.8% in year‑on‑year terms in February, having declined by 2.1% in January. The reversal was mainly due to a one-off base effect in electricity prices, resulting from the implementation of the emergency law mitigating the impact of high network charges on households at the beginning of 2025.[61] It is estimated to have raised February’s headline inflation rate by 0.5 percentage points. To a lesser extent the rise in energy prices was also driven by solid fuels, which recorded a second consecutive month of pronounced price rises, and were 16.6% more expensive than in December 2025.

Figure 6.1: Headline inflation and pipeline pressures for other goods prices

Sources: SURS, Eurostat. Latest data left: February 2026, right: February 2026, domestic producer prices – January 2026 and import prices – December 2025.

By contrast, food price inflation has been easing over the last few months, the year‑on‑year rate slowing to 4.3% in February, down 0.3 percentage points on January.[62] The slowdown was entirely driven by processed food prices, which have remained practically unchanged since November of last year. Over this period their contribution to food inflation nearly halved, to 1.7 percentage points. Conversely the contribution of unprocessed food prices increased markedly, to 2.5 percentage points, mainly in reflection of higher prices of fruit and vegetables. Conditions along production and supply chains are generally easing, as food commodity prices on global and euro area markets have been falling since the middle of last year. Stabilisation is also evident further downstream in the chain, particularly in import prices, while domestic producer prices remain elevated; most recently, in January, they were up 4.7% year-on-year.

Core inflation continues to be driven mainly by domestic factors related to developments in the labour market.

Core inflation, i.e. inflation excluding energy and food prices, stood at 2.3% in February, down 0.1 percentage points on January. The slowdown reflected weaker year-on-year growth in prices of other goods, which declined by 0.5 percentage points to 0.3%, mainly due to a base effect in the wake of relatively high current price rises in February of last year. Other goods inflation nevertheless remains supported by domestic cost factors, as evidenced by the divergence between growth in import prices and domestic producer prices (Figure 6.1, right). The divergence is primarily attributable to rising labour costs and their pass-through into consumer prices.

Rising labour costs are also being reflected in service price inflation: the year-on-year rate strengthened to 3.9% in February (up from 3.7% in January), following sharp monthly rises in February.[63] Indeed, the inflation momentum[64] indicator confirms the persistence of service price inflation, which picked up again in recent months after gradually declining last year and signalling fading inflationary pressures. The share of services firms expecting to raise selling prices has been increasing again since November, particularly in rental and leasing activities, services to buildings and landscape activities, warehousing, storage and support activities for transportation, and in accommodation and food service activities (Figure 6.2, left).

Developments in core inflation remain primarily driven by domestic price factors. Growth in the GDP deflator, which measures the rise in prices of domestically produced goods and services, remained at 3.7% in the final quarter of last year. Labour costs continued to be the main driver, although their impact on consumer prices was partly offset by higher labour productivity. Over the same period the contribution of unit profits has also increased, which could indicate a rebound in profit margins (Figure 6.2, right).

Figure 6.2: Price factors in services prices and GDP deflator

Sources: SURS, Banka Slovenije calculations. Latest data left: February 2026, right: Q4 2025.

Note: In the left chart the selling price expectations in the service sector relate to the next three months, while the inflation momentum indicator is calculated as the annualised rate of growth in the seasonally adjusted services price index by comparing the average level of prices in the last three months with that from the preceding three months. Labour costs in the right chart are employee compensation per employee.

7Fiscal Position

The consolidated general government deficit widened by just over 1 percentage point last year to 2.5% of GDP, and is expected to increase further this year.

According to the cashflow methodology, the consolidated general government deficit amounted to EUR 1,773 million or 2.5% of GDP last year, up significantly from 1.4% of GDP in the previous year (Figure 7.1). The majority of the deficit originated from the state budget (EUR 1,711 million); municipalities halved their deficit to EUR 112 million, while the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia (ZZZS) ended the year with a surplus. With the deficit projected to increase further this year – despite the expected improvement in economic growth – the fiscal space for countercyclical measures in the event of larger shocks is narrowing.

Figure 7.1: Consolidated general government revenue, expenditure and position, and general government position